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Abstract ： 
This thesis studies the team problem from the approach of 
principal—agent theory. It studies the situation in which a 
principal employs a group of workers whose efforts affect the 
principal's payoff ' but their efforts are not observable to the 
- p r i n c i p a l . 
The thesis consists of two parts . Each part may be read as 
a separate p a p e r . Part I studies why the personnel relationship 
in a short term team is usually so bad and there is a feeling of 
alienation among the w o r k e r s . It will use the concept of 
coalitional equilibrium, and shows that the feeling of'alienation 
is , in fact, an efficient institution given the asymmetric 
information c o n s t r a i n t . It will show also that , if each member of 
a team is altruistic to other members instead of being self-
interested , t h e n the principal will be better o f f . It will prove 
that , if the team r e l a t i o n s h i p is long, there exists a perfect 
equilibrium in which each member will pretend to be altruistic 
except in the last few p e r i o d s . Moreover the thesis will also model 
the sub-contracting s y s t e m , the supervisory s y s t e m , and the 
situation in which there is a leader in a team and show that the 
supervisory system is superior to the other t w o . 
Part 工 1 contains a proof the existence theorem of optimal 
information system in monitoring agents' e f f o r t . Page (1987) has 
proved that given a certain information s y s t e m , there exists an 
optimal incentive scheme in the case of a single agent. Allen 
(1983), B o l y a n , and Cotter (1987) have tried to model the topology 
of information system • This part of the thesis is an extension of 
their r e s u l t s . It will prove that given members of a team are not 
fully but only bounded rational, there exists an optimal 
information system in monitoring the team • 
CONTENT: 
I n t r o d u c t i o n : p . l 
Outline o f . t h e thesis: p.9 
Part 工： 
List of n o t a t i o n s : p . 1 2 
Chapter I: 
Basic m o d e l p.16 
Chapter 工工： 
S e l f - i n t e r e s t e d team p . 2 1 
Chapter III 
A l t r u i s t i c team p . 33 
Chapter IV: 
S u b - c o n t r a c t i n g and s u p e r v i s o r y system p . 4 5 
Chapter V: 
Team w i t h leader p . 5 5 
Chapter VI: 
C o n c l u s i o n of part I p . 5 9 
A p p e n d i x : p . 6 1 
Part工工： 
Chapter V工工 
The e x i s t e n c e theorem of optimal 
i n f o r m a t i o n system of one agent p . 8 2 -
Chapter V I I I : 
E x t e n s i o n to a team p . 1 0 4 
R e f e r e n c e : p . 11.4 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship of agency , as defined by Stephen Ross ( 
51 ), exists between two { or more ) parties when one , c^esignaCed 
as the a g e n t , acts on the b e h a l f , or as representative for the 
other, d e s i g n a t e d the principal in a particular domain of decision 
‘problems. The relationship is very common in daily social 
interactions. For example, lawyers have complete authority to work 
for their c l i e n t s . Doctors practice m e d i c a l treatment to their 
patients. Managers take up the daily d e c i s i o n of firms for 
stockholders • Employees do their jobs and exert their effort for 
the e m p l o y e r s . Insurance takers have control over their properties 
and p r e v e n t i v e measures which decrease the probability of 
accidents o c c u r r i n g , thereby reducing the p r o b a b i l i t y of claiming 
compensation from insurers. All these are typical examples of the 
agency r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
To be clear, behind the agency r e l a t i o n s h i p , there is 
a contractual relationship between the agent and the principal. The 
agents are contracted to take some actions for the principal, and 
the p r i n c i p a l rewards the agents. It is d i f f e r e n t from the 
traditional m a r k e t r e l a t i o n s h i p . T r a d i t i o n a l l y economics studies 
the exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p . The Arrow-Debreu ( See 13 ) framework 
studies the case of perfect information. Under such an assumption 
of perfect i n f o r m a t i o n , the efficiency of m a r k e t is studied. It is 
1 
proved that without increasing returns of scale in production, a 
competitive equilibrium e x i s t s . In Debreu's T h e o r y of Value, all 
goods that are exchanged are called coimnodities• It seems 
interesting that there is not any good called the level of 
hardworking of w o r k e r , or the level of effort of manager, the 
amount the insured devoted to preventive f a c i l i t i e s , etc. This 
lack of the special term is n a t u r a l , because the m o d e l has assumed 
‘perfect knowledge in the e c o n o m y . So a contract that specifies the 
effort level of worker will be treated as one coimnodity and the 
contract is feasible because of perfect knowledge • 
M o r e o v e r , when the general equilibrium m o d e l is extended 
to incorporate the existence of uncertainty with many possible 
states of nature , the assumption of symmetric inforination is still 
u s e d . There appears something called contingent commodity, which 
specifies each commodity at a different state as a different 
commodity and there is a price for each of these commodities. 
Exchange occurs before the state of nature is actually realized. 
Now return to the above e x a m p l e . There is one c o m m o d i t y :、In a 
rainy d a y , work hard for three hours‘ and another commodity 、工n a 
sunny d a y , work hard for three hours. ' Such contract is still 
feasible because realization of the states: sunny or rainy and, 
the effort level of the worker is known by all in the economy. Then 
under the assumption of symmetric information, even when there is 
uncertainty about the states of nature, the c o m p e t i t i v e equilibrium 
still satisfies the Pareto efficient c r i t e r i a . 
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The Arrow-Debreu framework is one of the greatest 
work in e c o n o m i c s . However,in the real w o r l d , the assumption of 
symmetric information seems not to h o l d . The lack of symmetry in 
formation is actually a common p h e n o m e n o n . One of the main causes 
of the p r o s p e r i t y of modern society is the practice of 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . The existence of comparative advantage makes 
everyone better o f f . The result of specialization is that one has 
more information on something than o t h e r s . One reason is that some 
jobs need time to learn. For example, specialization turns a man 
into a doctor and he studies for years to gain the knowledge of 
medical p r a c t i c e . Lawyers have studied years about law. Another 
reason is that information is naturally hidden , and -it is too 
costly to obtain information • For example, how can.you check how 
much effort a worker has supplied in removing a t r e e , or the time 
a manager spends thinking intensely for the firm? The asymmetry 
of information will make the problem more complicated , but it is 
also more p r o m i s i n g in explaining the real w o r l d . 
The existence of asymmetric information is the 
fundamental assumption of the p r i n c i p a l — a g e n t t h e o r y . There is then 
a question : if the action of the agent is not known to the 
principal, then if the outcome has a one-to-one relationship to 
action, then the principal can infer the action of the agents. So 
asymmetric information is not a real p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r , in the real 
3 
world, it seems not very true everywhere. For instance, after the 
agent has supplied some actions, the outcome may be subject to 
some s t o c h a s t i c variables that are not observable to the principal. 
For e x a m p l e , even if a manager has tried his best in managing the 
firm, the m a r k e t condition may be so u n p r e d i c t a b l e that the firm 
may not get p r o f i t . Another reason may be that there is no precise 
and accurate measure of the agent's a c t i o n . For example,,if the 
effort level of a manager is measured by hours of working , he may 
sit in the office for a long time, but just think about his own 
m a t t e r s , not about the fiirm. 
The existence of asyinnietric information with random 
and u n o b s e r v a b l e variables is essential for the principal-agent 
theory. To make the agents carry out some a c t i o n s , the principal 
should d e s i g n payoff functions for the agents which specify how 
much income the agents will receive when an o u t c o m e is realized. 
It is called the incentive compatibility c o n s t r a i n t . For example, 
to make the manager work h a r d , a bonus and p e n a l t y system can be 
u s e d . (See Lewis 31) 
H o w e v e r , when the payoff to the agent is dependent on 
the outcome r e a l i z e d , it will mean that there will be a fluctuation 
in the p a y o f f . How can the principal attract the agent to sign the 
contract so that he will work for the p r i n c i p a l , and the principal 
will give him some income dependent on the realized outcome? It 
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should clear that the expected utility of the agent when he enters 
in the c o n t r a c t , should at least equal to the best alternative he 
can get from not entering into the c o n t r a c t . This constraint on the 
payoff function is called the individually r a t i o n a l l y constraint 
or the p a r t i c i p a t i o n constraint. 
So the traditional principal agent theory studies the 
optimal incentive scheme which maximizes the principal's expected 
payoff subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the 
participation constraint • It is further assumed that the agents 
are usually risk a v e r s e . The incentive scheme also perforins some 
function in risk sharing between the p]rincipal and the agent. In 
the early literature in the principal-agent t h e o r y , for example, 
Ross (53)' H a r r i s and Raviv (22), Holmstroin (24) , the case of one 
principal and one agent is s t u d i e d . That is only one agent who 
alone affects the principal's p a y o f f . The first—order approach is 
used to m o d e l the incentive compatibility constraint- The 
conclusion is that the presence of asymmetric information makes the 
principal worse o f f . M o r e o v e r , if the action of the agent induced 
by the o p t i m a l incentive scheme is assumed to have rising 
"likelihood ratio p r o p e r t y " , then the incentive scheme will give 
higher income to the agent when the outcome is more favourable. 
Since in the real w o r l d , workers are u s u a l l y grouped in 
a team to work with each o t h e r , the extension of the principal-
5 
agent theory is essential. The formal modelling a team from the P— 
A theory was done by Homlstrom (25) and M o o k h e r j e e (43) However, 
in both s t u d i e s , the team is just a grouping of workers with each 
worker p r o d u c i n g his own product which is independent of other's 
effort. The reason why they are grouped into a team is because they 
are all subject to some common random v a r i a b l e s in their 
p r o d u c t i o n . The optimal contract to each worker depends not.only 
on his own o u t p u t ,but also on others' output since the latter 
reveals some information on the common random v a r i a b l e s . This kind 
of team is c o m m o n , the most typical example b e i n g a team of 
salesmen. 
Ma (35,36) is based on Mookherjee's m o d e l in which each 
worker in a team has his own output that is o b s e r v a b l e to 
p r i n c i p a l . He then studied how the principal can utilize each 
a g e n t r e p o r t on others' e f f o r t . Moreover Ma still assumed that 
there are a finite number of possible output states for each agent. 
Then there is a question : Can the assumption that each agent can 
report on o t h e r s be more realistic so that only one agent can 
report to the principal? This induces the author to study the so 
called s u p e r v i s o r y system in this thesis. 
M o r e o v e r , in the real world, there is another kind of 
team in which each member works together but there is no any 
separate output sfor each w o r k e r , and there is only one output : 
the team o u t p u t . (See Alchian and Demsetz 1) For e x a m p l e , in a firm, 
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the shareholder sees nothing but the total profit of firm, not the 
profit earned- by each of the d i r e c t o r s . The boss observes the total 
profit of a firm, not the profit earned by each of the staff 
members. This is an inteiresting topic to study, and this paper 
will study this . 
I 
The paper will formally model a situation in which several 
people work together but there is only one output ( profit ) of the 
team. This output depends on each worker's effort and some 
stochastic f a c t o r s . The principal can n e i t h e r observe their effort 
nor the s t o c h a s t i c factors. Each worker chooses his effort level, 
and he cannot observe the stochastic factors even after it has been 
realized. What is the optimal incentive scheme to each worker? 
What will happen if each member is not self interested , but will 
consider other members‘ benefit before he decides to give his 
effort ？ Will the principal be better off ？ why is there a 
supervisor in many teams ？ Is such a s u p e r v i s o r y system more 
efficient or is a system in which the p r i n c i p a l subcontracts the 
team output to one of the members in a team better ？ Usually in a 
team , there is a leader among the w o r k e r s , does this make the 
principal b e t t e r off ？ All these questions will be studied in part 
工 of this t h e s i s . 
Part I of the thesis is a standard application of the 
principal agent theory technique to study the team problem. 
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H o w e v e r , part 工工 will try to make some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s of some 
results in part I . In part I, the p r i n c i p a l is to choose an optimal 
incentive scheme given the information system in which the team 
profit is o n l y the signal to the pirincipal. H o w e v e r , it is quite 
a restrictive assumption • To study the o p t i m a l team structure, it 
is essential to study the optimal infoirination system • Some recent 
economic l i t e r a t u r e s begin to model the t o p o l o g i c a l properties：of 
the i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m , for e x a m p l e , A l l e n (2) , B o y l a n , Cotter 
(II). H o w e v e r , they mainly deal with the g e n e r a l equilibrium with 
u n c e r t a i n t y . Part 工工 of - this thesis will try to model the 
information system and apply it to the team p r o b l e m . Page (46) has 
p r o v e d , in the case of one principal and one agent under that 
given an i n f o r m a t i o n system, under some a s s u m p t i o n s there exists 
an optimal i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e . The e x i s t e n c e of an optimal system 
of incentive schemes in the case the of a team w i l l be proved in 
this t h e s i s . The existence holds r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r team members 
are s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d or a l t r u i s t i c . Then the a s s u m p t i o n of bounded 
r a t i o n a l i t y is t a k e n . The system cost is also m o d e l l e d . It will 
be shown that there exists an optimal i n f o r m a t i o n system • It will 
also be shown that some results of part I are s p e c i a l cases of a 
general t h e o r y . F i n a l l y , Part I and Part II can be looked as two 
independent p a p e r s . 
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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
PART 工 
In chapter 工 ， t h e basic model of p a r t 工 will be presented, 
with a s s u m p t i o n s . In chapter 11, it will be shown that, if each 
I 
member behaves m y o p i c a l l y and in a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d w a y , the 
principal will use a second best incentive s c h e m e . 
In chapter III, it will be shown that, if each worker in the 
team has an altruistic attitude, that is ,if he does not maximize 
his own u t i l i t y , but also considers other members‘ we l f a r e , the 
principal w i l l be better o f f . It will also be shown that, if the 
working p e r i o d is long enough , a self interested worker will 
"pretend" or behave as if he were a altruistic w o r k e r except in the 
last few p e r i o d s . 
In chapter IV, the paper will investigate the sub-contracting 
system . Also the paper studies the supervisory system: a team in 
which one m e m b e r acts as the supervisor w h o reports o t h e r s ' effort 
level to the p r i n c i p a l . It will be show that a supervisory system 
is superior to both the sub-contracting system and the traditional 
second-best s y s t e m , 
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second-best s y s t e m . 
In chapter V , the situation in which there is an implicated 
leader among team members is studied. It will also be shown that 
the existence of a team leader will make the principal better off 
than in the traditional second-best t e a m . , 
At last, a short conclusion of Part 工 will be presented in 
chapter VI 
PART II 
In chapter V I I , the basic model of Part 工工 will be stated. 
The case of one agent is studied . The term "information system" 
will be modelled • The existence of an optimal incentive scheme 
under a p a r t i c u l a r information system is proved . The assumption 
of bounded r a t i o n a l i t y will also be a d o p t e d . The concept of system 
cost is also introduced • Then the existence of an optimal 
information system is p r o v e d . 
In chapter V I I I , the results of the chapter VII is extended 
to a team. The team is m o d e l l e d . All the theorems of chapter VII 
are also extended to a self-interested team as well as an 





LIST OF N O T A T I O N S OF PART I 
A A g e n t A 
B A g e n t B 
Q the team o u t p u t 
公 the lowest p o s s i b l e team o u t p u t 
Q the h i g h e s t p o s s i b l e team o u t p u t 
% 
‘a act i o n of agent A 
b a c t i o n of agent B 
F ( . ; a , b ) . . . the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n of the 
team o u t p u t to o c c u r when A s u p p l i e s a , B supplies b . 
the p r o b a b i l i t y d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n of the team output 
to o c c u r when A s u p p l i e s a, B s u p p l i e s b . 
the d e r i v a t i v e of F(•；a,b) w i t h r e s p e c t to a 
Fb(.,a,b).- the d e r i v a t i v e of F(.；a,b) w i t h r e s p e c t to b 
U(y) the u t i l i t y of the agent w h e n he g e t s y amount of 
i n c o m e 
{•) the m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y 
U’，（.）•...• the second o r d e r d e r i v a t i v e of .U(•) w i t h respect to 
i n c o m e 
U-i the i n v e r s e f u n c t i o n of U(.) 
V(a) the d i s u t i l i t y when A s u p p l i e s a 
• • ( . ) . • • . . • the m a r g i n a l d i s u t i l i t y of s u p p l i e d a c t i o n . 
V'|(.) the second o r d e r d e r i v a t i v e of V(.) with r e s p e c t to 
a c t i o n 
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辽 the reservation utility of the agent A and agent B 
Ct the collection of all real-valued first order 
differentiable functions with the domain 
M the collection of all real-valued first order 
d i f f e r e n t i a b l e and increasing functions with the 
domain [Q,Q] 
the incentive scheme to A , 
‘T(-) the incentive scheme to B 
GA(S,T,a,b) the expected utility of A given the incentives 
S(.),T(•),and action a,b 
GB(S,T,a,b) the expected utility of B given the incentives 
S(•),T(•),and action a,b 
GP(S,T,a,lD) the expected utility of the p r i n c i p a l given the 
incentives S(.),T(.),and action a,b 
SGA(a,b,S)..the expected utility of the sub-boss under the sub-
c o n t r a c t i n g system given the incentive scheme S(Q) to 
him ,and a,b are supplied 
Nash(S,T)...the collection of all the Nash equilibrium actions pair 
(a,b) given the incentive schemes s(.),T(.) 
牵 the null set 
F(S'T) the collection of all the action pairs that can be 
implemented by the incentive schemes S(.),T(.) when 
the agents are self-interested and there is no 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n among them 
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CE(S,T) the collection of all the action pairs that can be 
implemented by the incentive schemes S ( . ) ,T(. ) when 
the agents are self—interested and have coirnnunication 
among them 
P O { S , T , h ) . . the collection of all the action pair that maximize 
the weighted average utility of A and B, by the weight 
h and 1-h respectively , given the incentive schemes 
S(.),T(.) 
C(S,T) the collection of all the action pairs that can be 
implemented by the incentive schemes S(.),T(.) when 
the agents are altruistic 
the collection of all the action pairs that can be 
implemented by a sub-contracting s y s t e m , given .incentive 
scheme S (.) to the sub-boss 
R(b) the action reported by supervisor A if B actually 
supplies action b 
F L ( S , T ) . . . . the collection of all the action pairs that can be 
implemented by the incentive schemes S(.),T(.) when 
A is the leader of the team 
PS the maximum expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can get if 
he employs a self-interested team and there ia no 
communication among the agents 
PCE the maximum expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can get if 
he employs a self-interested team and there is 
communication among the agents 
14 
PC the maximum expected utility the principal can get if 
he employs an altruistic team 
PSC the maximum expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can get if 
he employs a team and uses the s u b — c o n t r a c t i n g systerrt 
PSS the maximum expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can get if 
he employs a team and uses the s u p e r v i s o r y system 
PL the maximum expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can get if 




One p r i n c i p a l 
Two w o r k e r s : A , B 
The p r i n c i p a l c a n n o t o b s e r v e the effort of A and B • There is 
o n l y one o u t p u t Q w h i c h is o b s e r v a b l e to the p r i n c i p a l . 
The o u t p u t Q is d e p e n d e n t on A's effort (a), B,s e f f o r t (b) , and 
some s t o c h a s t i c v a r i a b l e which is not o b s e r v a b l e to the p r i n c i p a l 
and the a g e n t s . 
So g i v e n a,b .there is a p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n function of 
Q : F ( Q ; a , b ) . The d e n s i t y function of F ( . ) is f ( Q ; a , b ) . • 
R e m a r k : 
Under this m o d e l , we assume that only o n e team o u t p u t is p r o d u c e d . 
It d i f f e r s from H o l m o s t r o m (25) and M o o k h e r j e e (43) in that they 
assume each w o r k e r in a. team produces a s e p a r a t e o u t p u t . Our m o d e l 
is s i m i l a r to the m o d e l of Radnar (51) • R a d n a r studies the 
c o o p e r a t i v e in w h i c h there is only one o u t p u t .-profit. H o w e v e r all 
p e o p l e in the c o o p e r a t i v e are bosses and s h o u l d c o n t r i b u t e some 
e f f o r t • • It d i f f e r s from our model in w h i c h all w o r k e r s are simply 
e m p l o y e e s . 
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Assumption 工 
Utility of agent A : U{income) - V(a) 
Utility of a g e n t B : U(income) - V(b) 
where a, b are A's and B's effort r e s p e c t i v e l y . The two agents 
are i d e n t i c a l . 
Given S (Q) , T{Q) the payment functions of A and B r e s p e c t i v e l y , the 
expected u t i l i t y of A and B : 、 
A : U ( S ( Q ) ) f ( Q ; a , b ) d Q - V(a) 
V 
B : U { T ( Q ) ) f ( Q ; a , b ) d Q 一 V(b) 
i) U’ （•） > 0, U’ ， （•） < 0 
ii) V . (.) > 0, V- • (.) > 0 
iii) a £ [0,1] , b £ [0,1] ' 
iv) V(0) = 0 
V) lim V,(a) = lim V'(b) = 0 , lim V'(a) = lim V ' ( b ) = + -
a—0 b-0 a—1 b — 1 
vi) U : r e s e r v a t i o n utility > 0 
Remark : 
i) The A s s u m p t i o n I.i means that the agents are risk a v e r s e , 
ii) The a s s u m p t i o n I.ii is a standard game theory assumption that 
each agent take actions out of a compact action s e t . 
iii) A s s u m p t i o n I.iii means that the marginal d i s u t i l i t y of work is 
increasing from zero to i n f i n i t e . This a s s u m p t i o n together with 
Assumption 工 i m p l i e s that the agents will n o t c h o o s e effort 1 or 
0 , thus e l i m i n a t i n g the problem of corner s o l u t i o n . 
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A s s u m p t i o n 工工 
P r i n c i p a l is risk n e u t r a l , and his u t i l i t y is equal to 
[ Q - T ( Q ) - S ( Q ) ] f(Q;a,b)dQ 
V 
Remark : 
A s s u m p t i o n 11 is a standard PA t h e o r y a s s u m p t i o n . Together 
with A s s u m p t i o n I . i , t h e r e is a gain if the p r i n c i p a l share more 
the risk from the a g e n t . 
D e f i n i t i o n I.l : 
D i s t r i b u t i o n f u n c t i o n F {. ) is s t o c h a s t i c d o m i n a n t to 
d i s t r i b u t i o n F* ( . ) if and only if F(Q) <. F* (Q) for all Q . It will be 
d e n o t e d by F { . F * ( . ) . 
� 
A s s u m p t i o n III 
i) Q s [Q,① 
ii) F(•；a,b) t F ( . ;a, ,b，） if (a,b) > (a，，b,) a n d (a，，b-) 
and F a ( Q ; a , b ) ^ 0, Fb(Q;a,b) 1 0 for all Q , a n d all (a,b). 
iii) F a ( Q ; a b ) < 0 , Fb(Q;a,b) < 0 for a l l (a,b). 
iv) F(.；a,b) = F(•；b,a) 
V) lim Fa/Q; a,b) = lim Fb(Q;a,b) = 一 《 for all (a,b) 
a-0 〜 b - 0 〜 
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Remark ： 
i) A s s u m p t i o n Ill.iii means that if one a g e n t tries more effort, 
the chance of g e t t i n g higher team output is l a r g e r , and the chance 
of getting the lowest output is stricty l o w e r . 
ii) A s s u m p t i o n Ill.iv means that agents p l a y i d e n t i c a l role in the 
team p r o d u c t i o n . 
iii) A s s u m p t i o n 工 工 工 . v m eans that the m a r g i n a l b e n e f i t of lowering 
the chance of low team output is very large w h e n the effort level 
is z e r o . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n with assumption I.v w i l l rule out the case 
of supply of zero effort level by any a g e n t . ( See also note I.l 
below ) 
Note I.l : 
A s s u m p t i o n I l l i v implies i) f{.;a,b) = f(.b,a) 
ii) fa{.；a,b) = fb(.；b,a) 
iii) if a=b, f a ( . ; a , b ) = fb(•；a,b) 
Proof: See a p p e n d i x 1 
D e f i n i t i o n 1.2 : 
={ L(.) w h e r e L(.) : [Q,Q] - R , and the f i r s t — o r d e r derivative 
L,(.) is w e l l d e f i n e d for all Q } That is , C^ is the collection 
of all f i r s t - o r d e r d i f f e r e n t i a b l e r e a l - v a l u e d f u n c t i o n s mapping 
from [Q^^Q] to R 
M 二 { • ) : U • ) £ C , L(Q) > L(Q' ) if Q > Q ' } 
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Note I.2 : 
� 
Assumption 工 工 I i i , i i i implies H ( Q ) f a ( Q ; a , b ) d Q > 0 
� 
•N 
for (a,b), all H{ . ) s M , and lim H (Q) f a (Q; a, b) dQ = + «« 
� 
for all b . 
proof : See a p p e n d i x 2 
20 
CHAPTER 1工 
ONE PERIOD MODEL 
1) First Best : if the principal can observe w o r k e r s ' effort 
d i r e c t l y . 
The principal‘s pro b l e m : 
max Q f{Q;a,b)dQ - S(a) - T(b) 
a , b ,、 
S{Q),T(Q) 
subject to S (a) = U'^ [ U + V ( a ) ] 
T(b) = u-l[ U + V ( b ) ] 
Remark : 
The first b e s t is what the principal can get if there is no any 
agency problem of asymmetric information of the agents‘ effort. It 
can be treated as reference p o i n t . 
2) Second best : Principal cannot observe e f f o r t s , but only the 
team o u t p u t . 
Definition 工 工 . 1 : 
GA(S,T,a,b) = U(S(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) 
V 
GB(S,T,a,b) = U(T(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ 一 V(b) 
� 
GP(S,T,a,b) = [Q - S(Q) - T(Q)] f(Q;a,b) dQ 
� 
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G A , GB is the expected utility of A and B given the incentive 
scheme S(Q), T(Q) to A and B respectively, and A , B plays effort 
a and b r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Note 工 工 . 1 : 
If S(.) £ C , then GA( ) is continuous in a, b . 
If T(.) £ C , then GB(.) is continuous in a, b . 
Definition 工 工 . 2 : 
Given (a*,b*) z Nash(S,T) iff 
a* £ arg m a x GA(S,T,a,b*) , a £ [0,1] 
a 
b* £ arg m a x GB(S,T,a*,b) , b £ [0,1] 
b 
Remark : 
i) As Homlstrom (25) and Mookherjee (43) do in modelling the 
behaviour of agents in a team, a game approach is u s e d . The agents 
are the players of the g a m e . The payoff functions of the players 
are their expected utility under the given incentive s c h e m e s . The 
actions played are the effort level. So the outcome behaviour of 
the team w i l l be taken to be the Nash solution of the actions of 
the associated g a m e . 
ii) This "Nash" approach to model the team members‘ behaviour 
implicitly assumes that they are playing the n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e g a m e . 
It is similar to the situation that each worker w i l l not 
communicate or coordinate his effort level with any other worker 
in the t e a m . 
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Note 工 工 . 2 ： 
If S,T £ C , then Nash(S,T> 
Proof : See a p p e n d i x 3 
P r o p o s i t i o n 11.1 : 
i) If S,T £ M , (a*,b*) £ N a s h ( S , T ) , and A I , A I I I , 
then 3 G A ( S , T , a * , b * ) + 0 GA (S , T , a* , b* ) > 0 
a b 
2)GB(S,T\a*,b*) + 3 GB (S , T , a* , b* ) > 0 
3 a 3 b 
ii) If a * = b * , (a*,b*) s N a s h ( S , T ) , AI and A I I I , 
then d G A ( S , T , a * , b * ) + 9 G A ( S , T , a * , b * ) > 0 
^ a 3 b 
^ G B ( S , T , a * , b * ) + 3GB (S , T, a* , b* ) > 0 
3 a a b 
Proof: See a p p e n d i x 4 
Remark : 
P r o p o s i t i o n 工 工 . l i m e a n s that given the i n c e n t i v e schemes of the two 
agents are m o n o t o n i c , that is , higher t e a m o u t p u t w i l l result in 
higher r e w a r d p a i d to t h e m , then the Nash e q u i l i b r i u m effort levels 
w i l l n e v e r be P a r e t o o p t i m a l to the a g e n t s . T h i s is because in the 
Nash e q u i l i b r i u m , the net m a r g i n a l cost to e a c h individual of an 
increase in e f f o r t is z e r o , but there is an e x t e r n a l b e n e f i t to the 
other a g e n t . So if each a g e n t supplies s l i g h t l y m o r e e f f o r t , both 
w i l l b e t t e r o f f . A l s o , if all agents are a l t r u i s t i c or if they 
collude , the p r o p o s i t i o n tells us that t h e r e is a p o t e n t i a l gain 
which can be r e a l i z e d . It is an important p r o p e r t y that will be 
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applied in the following concept of c o a l i t i o n a l equilibrium 
(Proposition 工 工 . 4 ) and the a l t r u i s t i c team of chapter 工工工• 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 . 3 : 
(a,b) 8 F(S,T) iff i) (a,b) £ Nash(S,T) 
ii) G A ( S , T , a , b ) >. U 
iii) G B ( S , T , a , b ) >. U 
If either N a s h ( S , T ) = <l> , or G i ( S , T , a , b ) < U for some i = A , B , 
for all (a,b) £ N a s h ( S , T ) , then F(S,T) = ^ . 
Remark : 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 . 3 i m o d e l s i n c e n t i v e c o m p a t i b i l i t y c o n s t r a i n t . That 
is , each w o r k e r supplies the effort level to m a x i m i z e his own 
expected u t i l i t y given the o t h e r , s effort level and the i n c e n t i v e 
s c h e m e . D e f i n i t i o n II.3.ii and 工 工 . S i i i r e q u ires that each agent at 
least gets the r e s e r v a t i o n u t i l i t y . 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 . 4 : 
We call [S*,T*] the second b e s t incentive scheme w i t h the o p t i m a l 
effort (a*,b*) if (a*,b*,S*,T*) solves the p r o b l e m : 
m a x G P ( S , T , a , b ) s u b j e c t to (a,b) £ F(S,T) 
a , b , 
S(Q),T(Q) 
D e f i n e PS = G P ( S * , T * , a * , b * ) 
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To c h a r a c t e r i z e the solution by the first order c o n d i t i o n s : 
M a x [ Q - S(Q) - T(Q) ] f(Q;a,b) dQ s u b j e c t e d to 
a , b ,、 
S(Q),T(Q) 
� 
i) U ( s ( Q ) ) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V’（a) = 0 
V 
ii) U(T(Q)) fb(Q;a,b) dQ - V'(b) = 0 
Ni 
iii) U(S (Q) ) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) >, U 
iv) U { T ( Q ) ) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V{b) > U 、 
Define the L a g r a n g i a n function : 
L = [ Q - S(Q) - T{Q) ] f(Q;a,b) dQ + � 
'S 
w*{ U(S{Q)) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V ' ( a ) } + 、 
w * ” U(T(Q)) fb(Q,a,b) dQ - V ' (b) } + 
V 
u M U(S{Q) ) f (Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) - U } + 
、 
u**{ U(T(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(b) - U } 
N e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s : 
1 dh{ ) = 0 S* (Q) = U,-l[ l/{ u* + w* f a ( Q ; a * . b * ) } ] 
^S(Q) f (Q;a*,b*) 
2 3L( ) = 0 T* (Q) = U,-l[ l/{ u** + w** fb(Q;a* ,b*) }] 
^ T ( Q ) f ( Q ; a * , b * ) 
� 
3 B L( ) = 0 U ( S * ( Q ) ) fa(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V ' (a*) = 0 
^ w* 、 




5 ) = 0 U(S*(Q)) f(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V(a*) = U 
— � 
6 ) = 0 U(T* (Q) ) f(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V(b*) = U 
au** 、 — 
s 
7 ？ _ _ L = 0 [ Q - S* (Q) - T M Q ) ] fa(Q;a*,b*) dQ + 
3 a 
w*{ U(S(Q)) faa(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V''(a*) }+ � 
w * M U{T* (Q) ) fab(Q;a*,b*) dQ 丨 + � 
u** [ U ( T M Q ) fa(Q;a*,b*) dQ } = 0 
8 ？ _ M _ L = 0 [ Q - S*(Q) -T*(Q)] fb{Q;a*,b*) dQ + 
>j � 
w*[ U{S*(Q) fab{Q;a*,b*) dQ } + 
w * M U ( T M Q ) ) fbb(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V,,(b*y } + 
V � 
u M U ( S M Q ) ) fb(Q;a*,b*) dQ 丨 = 0 
Remark : 
As in the traditional p r i n c i p a l - a g e n t literature , 
throughout part I of this thesis, the first^order approach 
is assumed to be sufficient • A more rigorous study will be 
presented in part I I . Also See Jewitt (27) and Brown (7). 
Assumption IV: 
The solution (a*,b*, S * ( Q ) ( Q ) ) of the second best has the 
strictly m o n o t o n i c likelihood ratios p r o p e r t i e s . That is , 




A s s u m p t i o n IV is u s u a l a s s u m p t i o n in the p r i n c i p a l〜 a g e n t 
l i t e r a t u r e . 
A s s u m p t i o n V : 
The s o l u t i o n in the second b e s t is (a*,b*,S*,T*) ,a*=b*. 
Remark : 
A s s u m p t i o n V m e a n s that the second b e s t o p t i m a l i n c e n t i v e schemes 
induce the two agents to supply the same e f f o r t l e v e l . It is 
r e a s o n a b l e b e c a u s e the two agents A and B are i d e n t i c a l in their 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n and p l a y an identical r o l e in the team production* 
This a s s u m p t i o n w i l l be used in p r o p o s i t i o n I I I - l . 
Note 工工， 4 : 
A V and the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n 1,2 imply t h a t S M • ) = T * { . ) . 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 . 5 : 
(a',b,) £ P O ( S , T , h ) if 
(a'b') £ a r g m a x [ h G A ( S , T , a , b ) + (1-h) G B ( S , T , a , b ) } 
(a,b) 
and h £ (0,1) 
So if 0< a'< 1 , 0 < b ' < 1 , 0 < h < 1 
(a'b*) £ P O ( S , T , h ) , the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s : 
% 
i) h [ U { S ( Q ) ) fa(Q;a'b') dQ - V'(a') } + 
V 
(1-h) [ U ( T ( Q ) ) fa(Q;a'b') dQ 丨 = 0 
27 
ii) h ( U{S(Q)) fb(Q;a’b’） dQ } + 
s» 
•s 
(1-h) f U(T(Q)) fb(Q;a'b') dQ - V {b') }= 0 、 
Remark : 
(ai,b,) £ P〇（S,T,h) m e a n s that g i v e n the incentive schemes S (Q), 
T ( Q ) ' (a,,b，）is the p a i r of efforts that m a x i m i z e the w e i g h t e d 
average of the two agents‘ expecte d u t i l i t y . So (a,,b,) is one of 
the Pareto o p t i m a l action pair from the view of the two a g e n t s . 
P r o p o s i t i o n 工 工 : 
G i v e n the c o n d i t i o n s of the p r o p o s i t i o n 1 . 1 , (a,b) s N a s h ( S , T ) 
implies (a,b) i PO(S,T,h) for all h z (0,1). -
Proof: 
(a'b) € N a s h ( S , T ) implies c)GA (S , T , a , b) + 9 G A ( S , T , a , b ) > 0 
^ a b 
3GB ( I + 5GB( )_ > 0 
3 a B b 
So G A ( S , T , a + e , b + e ) > G A ( S , T , a , b ) 
G B ( S , T , a + e , b + e ) > G B ( S , T , a , b ) 
for e > 0 and s u f f i c i e n t l y s m a l l . 
(a+e,b+e) Pareto d o m i n a t e s (a,b). So (a,b) t PO(S,T,h) 
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Definition II.6 ： 
(a,b) £ CE(S,T) if 
1) G A ( . , . , S , T ) , GB(.,.,S,T) are the payoff functions to A and B 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
2) The a d m i s s i b l e coalitional structure is [ {A,B} , {A}, { B } ] 
3) (a,b) is the coalitional equilibrium strategy under 1,2 • 
For the d e f i n i t i o n of the coalitional equilibrium , see appendix 
5. 
Remark : 
The c o n c e p t of coalitional equilibrium is introduceci here 
because this is a very robust s o l u t i o n . M o r e o v e r , the concept come 
from the c o o p e r a t i v e game in which players can communicate and 
coordinate their actions. The application of the coalitional 
equilibrium m o d e l s a team in which agents can communicate with each 
o t h e r . The following proposition will show some characteristics of 
the c o a l i t i o n a l equilibrium. 
Proposition II.3 : 
1) S (Q) , T(Q) £ M , then CE(S,T) = 
2) for all (a,b) such that a=b, implies (a,b) t CE(S,T) for all 
S , T . 
Proof : See appendix 6. 
29 
Remark ： 
To e n s u r e the e x i s t e n c e of a c o a l i t i o n a l e q u i l i b r i u m , S,T 
should n o t be i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n s , and the a c t i o n i m p l e m e n t e d 
should n o t be such that a=b • A l l these r e s u l t s seem to be too 
r e s t r i c t i v e . 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 . 7 : 
PCE = m a x G P ( a , b , S , T ) s u b j e c t to i) (a,b) z CE(S,T) 
ii) G A ( a , b , S , T ) >_ U 
iii) G B ( a , b , S , T )丄 U 
Let (a',b，，S',T,) be the s o l u t i o n to the above p r o b l e m . 
Remark : 
This PCE is the m a x i m u m e x p e c t e d u t l i t y w h i c h the p r i n c i p a l 
can a c h i e v e if i) team w o r k e r s are a l l o w e d to c o m m u n i c a t e ； ii) 
w o r k e r s form a r o b u s t c o l l u s i o n w i t h i n the t e a m , so that each w i l l 
have no i n c e n t i v e to d e v i a t e to change the e f f o r t level ； and iii) 
each w o r k e r at least gets the r e s e r v a t i o n u t i l i t y . 
The f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l show that the p r i n c i p a l w i l l 
prefer the s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h w o r k e r s are p r o h i b i t e d to c o m m u n i c a t e 
and c o o r d i n a t e in s u p p l y i n g their e f f o r t to the s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n are a l l o w e d . 
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P r o p o s i t i o n 1工.4 ： 
1) PS >. PCE 
2) If the s o l u t i o n (a*,b*,S*,T*) of PS is a u n i q u e s o l u t i o n of the 
s e c o n d - b e s t p r o b l e m , and either A I V or A V h o l d s , then PS > P C E . 
Proof: 
1) Since C E ( S , T ) S N a s h ( S , T ) , PS = m a x GP( ) s u b j e c t to 
i) (a,b) £ N a s h ( S , T ) 
ii) G A ( a , b , S , T ) U 
iii) G B ( a , b , S , T ) >_ U 
So (a,,b，，S,,T,) is still feasible under the s e c o n d b e s t p r o b l e m . 
2) Since if (a*,b*) s a t i s f i e s A I V , the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s 1,2 
imply that S* (Q) and T* (Q) are s t r i c t l y i n c r e a s i n g . So 
CE(S* (Q) (Q) ) = <!> • 
Similarly ,if A V h o l d s , then (a*,b*) i C E { S * , T * ) . 
PS = G P ( a * , b * , S * , T * ) > GP(a，，b,,S,,T,) = PCE 
The strict i n e q u a l i t y holds b e c a u s e (a,,b，，S,,T,〉 is feasible in 
the s e c o n d - b e s t p r o b l e m and b e c a u s e of the a s s u m p t i o n of a unique 
solution of ( a * , b * , S * , T * ) . 
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Conclusion ： 
If the employer cannot observe agents‘ effort ,then he should 
implement their efforts through some incentive s c h e m e s . If each 
worker is self-interested and tries to maximize his own expected 
u t i l i t y , then prohibiting agents from communicating is good to the 
p r i n c i p a l . Because if agents are allowed to communicate, there may 
be no equilibrium effort level in many incentive schemes ,( That 
is CE(S,T) = $ ). So to ensure the existence of some equilibrium 
effort level, the principal faces stronger constraints in choosing 
incentive schemes than under the situation of no communication 
among team m e m b e r s . Hence the principal will never be better off 
if workers communicate among themselves. 
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CHAPTER III ALTRUISTIC TEAM 
Introduction : 
In chapter 工 工 ， t h e second best solution is obtained 
under the assumption that workers are self—interested• But what 
will happen if workers are altruistic ？ That is , a worker does not 
only maximize his own expected utility, but he also maximizes a 
weighted average of his own and his colleague's expected utility 
• The intuition is that the principal will be better off. It is 
because he can now use an incentive scheme that only pays the 
agents slightly higher when the output is h i g h , and slightly lower 
when the output is low, that is, less risky incentive scheme • If 
workers are self-interested, a less risky incentive scheme will 
result in low effort, because the benefit of high outpirt is not 
very high in such a scheme. However, if workers are altruistic , 
they will still supply high effort level, because the increase in 
effort not only increases his benefit, but also others' benefit. 
So to get high effort level, a less risky scheme is adequate and 
better sharing of risk between the principal and each agent 
results. The principal's expected cost of implementing efforts will 
be lower. 
A l s o , it is a well known fact in the literature of game 
theory that if a game is repeated many times, self-interested 
players will behave as if they were altruistic in the early stages. 
This chapter will also establish a similar r e s u l t . Provided that 
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the team r e l a t i o n s h i p is long enough, all s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d w o r k e r s 
w i l l b e h a v e as if they w e r e altruistic except in the last few 
p e r i o d s . 
For s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , it will be assumed that in a a l t r u i s t i c 
team, each m e m b e r w i l l m a x i m i z e the total e x p e c t e d utility of all 
team m e m b e r s . 
D e f i n i t i o n III.l : 
(a*,b*) £ C(S,T) iff (a*,b*).£ P〇(S,T,l/2), that is 
(a*,b*) £ a r g m a x (1/2 G A ( a , b , S , T ) + 1/2 G B ( a , b , S , T ) } 
(a,b) 
or e q u i v a l e n t l y , (a*,b*) s a r g m a x f G A ( a , b , S , T ) + GB(a,b,S,T)} 
(a,b) 
Remark : 
D e f i n i t i o n III.l s i g n i f i e s the b e h a v i o u r of workers in an 
a l t r u i s t i c team . It states that given the i n c e n t i v e scheme 
S ( Q ) , T ( Q ) , team members w i l l supply the e f f o r t s (a*,b*) that 
m a x i m i z e the total of all team members‘ expe c t e d u t i l i t y . It is 
d i f f e r e n t from the Nash s o l u t i o n case w h i c h signifies the 
s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h each team member behaves in a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d 
w a y . 
D e f i n i t i o n 工工工 . 2 : 
PC = m a x G P ( a , b , S , T ) s u b j e c t to 
a , b , 
S,T 
i) (a,b) £ C(S,T) 
ii) G A ( a , b , S , T ) ^ U 
iii) GB(a,b,S,T) ^ U 
34 
Remark ： 
PC is the m a x i m u m e x p e c t utility the p r i n c i p a l can achieve if 
he e m p l o y s an a l t r u i s t i c t e a m , and s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t that 
each team m e m b e r will at least get the r e s e r v a t i o n u t i l i t y . The 
f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l show that the p r i n c i p a l will be better 
off if he e m p l o y s an a l t r u i s t i c team i n s t e a d of a team c o n s i s t i n g 
‘of s e l f — i n t e r e s t e d w o r k e r s . 
P r o p o s i t i o n I I I . 1 ： 
If A s s u m p t i o n I - V h o l d , then PC 〉 PS 
Proof ： 
I) Let to be the solution to PS , there exists 
S#(Q) such that (a*,a*) s C ( S # , S # ) , 
、 
a n d S M Q ) f ( Q ; a 、 a 大 ） d Q > S # { Q ) f ( Q ; a 大，a大）dQ • 
%) 
% 
Proof : See a p p e n d i x 7 . 
工 工 ） P C >. 大 ， S # , S # ) > G P (a* , a大，S* , S * ) = P S . 
The p r o p o s i t i o n is p r o v e d . 
Remark : 
The k e y in p r o v i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n is to e s t a b l i s h that S#(Q) 
f l u c t u a t e s less than S M Q ) • Since w o r k e r s are risk a v e r s e , the 
i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e r e s u l t i n g in less f l u c t u a t i o n of income means 
better s h a r i n g of risk a m o n g agents and p r i n c i p a l • So to keep 
workers w i t h at least the r e s e r v a t i o n u t i l i t y , e x p e c t e d p a y m e n t s 
to w o r k e r s can be l o w e r e d . 
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H o w e v e r from the economic point of v i e w , we believe p e o p l e are 
i n t r i n s i c a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d . Is the altruistic team a r e a s o n a b l e 
assumption? The f o l l o w i n g w i l l answer the q u e s t i o n by c o n s t r u c t i n g 
the case in w h i c h s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d w o r k e r s w i l l p r e t e n d to be 
a l t r u i s t i c . Two a d d i t i o n a l assumptions are taken, and the team 
r e l a t i o n s h i p is e x t e n d e d to m u l t i p l e p e r i o d s . 
A s s u m p t i o n V I 
A g e n t A can o b s e r v e agent B's effort after B supplies the 
effort • A g e n t B can observe A's effort after A supplies the 
e f f o r t . 
Remark : 
A s s u m p t i o n VI is e s s e n t i a l because it means that d e v i a t i o n of 
the "altruistic effort" of any one will be observed by a n o t h e r . 
Only under this s i t u a t i o n can revenge be used to p r e v e n t any 
d e v i a t i o n . ( See M o r e on A n t i - F o l k T h e o r e m , 39 ) 
A s s u m p t i o n 工工工‘ 
A . I II,i-•) r e m a i n true only for all (a,b) such that 0 < a , 0<b 
and a d d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n 工工工， v i : F(Q;a,0) = F(Q;0,b) = 1 for all 
Q £ iQrQ] • 
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Remark ： 
A s s u m p t i o n 工工工’ g u a r a n t e e s the e x i s t e n c e of the effective 
revenge a c t i o n for each a g e n t . It a s s u m e s that if any agent gives 
zero e f f o r t , t h e r e w i l l be no chance for the team o u t p u t to be 
g r e a t e r than the m i n i m u m . So zero e f f o r t is an e f f e c t i v e revenge 
action a g a i n s t any w o r k e r ' s d e v i a t i o n from the "altruistic 
a c t i o n " . 
The f o l l o w i n g w i l l show how the m o d e l can be e x t e n d e d to multi-
p e r i o d . In the f i r s t p e r i o d , A and B are c o n t r a c t e d into a team for 
N p e r i o d s . S ( Q ) , T(Q) are the i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e s for A and B . In 
each p e r i o d , A and B choose the effort l e v e l s . T h e n the team output 
is r e a l i z e d , and S ( Q ) , T ( Q ) w i l l be p a i d to A and B r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Then A and B c h o o s e the effort level in the n e x t p e r i o d . For 
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , w e a s s u m e the d i s c o u n t r a t e of the two agents are 
z e r o . So the s i t u a t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d as the f o l l o w i n g g a m e . 
a i ' V Qi a2,b2' Q2 a],。〕’ Q3 ‘ ajj'V Q^ 
period 1 p e r i o d 2 p e r i o d 3 p e r i o d N 
S o , g i v e n (a^, b^; a〗，b〗；a〕，b]; a^j, bjj), 
N 




the expected u t i l i t y of B = Z GB(a卜，b卜，S,T) 
t=l 
m N 
Define GA = Z GA (a^, b^, S , T) 
t=m 
m N 
GB = Z GB(at,bt,S,T) 
t=in 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 I . 3 : 
History at p e r i o d t, hg = <|) 
= { (ai ,bi) ; (a2 , b 2 ) ;… • } 
t-1 
D e f i n e H^ . = [ h^ w h i c h is p o s s i b l e } = n[0,l]x[0,l] 
D e f i n i t i o n 工 工 工 . 4 : 
Strategy of A at time t is a function m a p p i n g from H,. to [0,1] 
A 
It is d e n o t e d by Sj. . The s t r a t e g y of B at time t is d e n o t e d by 
B 
St . 
De f i n ition 111.5 : 
A A A A A B . B B B B 
Define s = (s^, S2, S3, Sjj ) , s = (s., S2, S3 ... Sj^  ) 
Am A A A Bm B B B 
S = (Sr Sjjj+i Sjj ) ' s = is^ ——Sjj , 
So we can w r i t e the e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y of agents to be a f u n c t i o n 
of strategy i n s t e a d of a series of actions pair : 
m Am Bm 
GA ( s ,s ； S, T ) 
m Am Bm 
GB ( s , s ; S, T ) 
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D e f i nition 工 工 工 . 6 ： 
Am Bm 
(s* ,s* ) is c a l l e d a Nash strategy pair if 
Am Bm Am Bm Am 
Ok (s* ,s* ) 1 GA (s ,s* ) for all s 
Am Bm Am Bm Bm 
GB (s* ,s* ) I GB (s* ,s ) for all s 
D e f i nition III.7 : 
A B Am Bm 
(s* , s* ) is c a l l e d a p e r f e c t e q u i l i b r i u m s t r a t e g y if (s* ,s* ) 
is a Nash s t r a t e g y pair for all m . 
Remark : 
Given a team w h i c h last for N p e r i o d s , the e f f o r t level of each 
worker in each p e r i o d should be m o d e l l e d . The c o n c e p t of 'perfect 
equilibrium is a p p l i e d . The concept of the p e r f e c t equilibrium 
includes that e a c h w o r k e r chooses the s e q u e n c e of e f f o r t level that 
maximizes his own expected utility g i v e n the i n c e n t i v e scheme and 
the the o t h e r agent‘s s t r a t e g y . M o r e o v e r , the s e q u e n c e of the 
effort l e v e l is s t i l l o p t i m a l at each s t a g e . It does n o t have the 
time i n c o n s i s t e n t p r o b l e m . 
Proposition III.2 : 
Given S# d e f i n e d in the p r o p o s i t i o n I I I . l ,if A s s u m p t i o n I, II, 
工 工 工 I , I V , V , then i) there exists an action p a i r (a'b") e N a s h ( S # , S # ) 
and a, > 0 , b ' > 0 . ii) (0,0) z N a s h ( S # , S # ) iii) GA(a’'b, , S#, S#) 
> G A ( 0 , 0 , S # , S # ) , G B ( a ' , b . , S # , S # ) > G B ( 0 , 0 , S # , S # ) 
Proof: See a p p e n d i x 8 
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R e m a r k ： 
P r o p o s i t i o n 111.2 states that there exist two N a s h e q u i l i b r a 
w i t h one P a r e t o d o m i n a n t to the o t h e r . This r e s u l t e n a b l e s us to 
apply B e n o i t and Krishna‘s r e s u l t { 5 ) in p r o v i n g p r o p o s i t i o n 
I I I . v . The e x i s t e n c e of any Pareto i n f e r i o r N a s h s o l u t i o n m a k e s the 
r e v e n g e e f f e c t i v e and c o n v i n c i n g . So if one agent w e r e to d e v i a t e 
from the " a l t r u i s t i c e f f o r t " , the o t h e r agent w o u l d r e v e n g e by 
s u p p l y i n g the "Pareto i n f e r i o r N a s h effort" in the r e m a i n i n g 
p e r i o d s . A n d if no a g e n t d e v i a t e s , the "altruistic effort" w i l l be 
supplied u n t i l the last few p e r i o d s , then the "Pareto s u p e r i o r N a s h 
e f f o r t “ w i l l be s u p p l i e d • So the p u n i s h m e n t of l o s i n g such a 
p o t e n t i a l g a i n w i l l be s e r i o u s e n o u g h to p r e v e n t any d e v i a t i o n . The 
formal p r o o f s of this idea w i l l be p r e s e n t e d in the two 
p r o p o s i t i o n s that f o l l o w . 
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P r o p o s i t i o n 111.3 ： 
AI,II,III’，VI,V,VI h o l d . Let (a*,a*) be the s o l u t i o n in the second-
best p r o b l e m , and S#(Q) defined in p r o p o s i t i o n III.l ,if the team 
w o r k i n g p e r i o d is i n f i n i t e , there exists a p e r f e c t equilibrium such 
that in each p e r i o d , (a*,a*) is carried o u t . 
Proof : 
It can be p r o v e d by finding a perfect e q u i l i b r i u m strategy pair 
w h i c h s u p p o r t s this o u t c o m e . 
A A A B B 
s* ： Si = a* s* : Si = a* 
A B 
St = a* if bt_i = a* for t > 1 s,. = a* if = a* 
A B 
St = 0 if i^ t-1 二 a* St = 0 if a,..^  = a* 
Remark : 
P r o p o s i t i o n III.3 states that if the team lasts for infinite 
p e r i o d s , then r e w a r d i n g w i t h the i n c e n t i v e scheme S#(Q) in each 
period is s t i l l p o s s i b l e to induce (a*,b*) in each p e r i o d . H o w e v e r , 
the i n f i n i t e l y lasting team is not a r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n . 
M o r e o v e r , w h e n the p r i n c i p a l - a g e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p is repeated 
i n f i n i t e l y , the p r i n c i p a l can achieve the first b e s t payoff • { 
See Radnar 50 , R u b i n s t e i n and Y a a r i 56 ) . So the incentive scheme 
S#(Q) w h i c h d e p e n d s only on current team o u t p u t w i l l not be an 
optimal i n c e n t i v e scheme to a team t h a t lasts w i t h infinite 
periods • The f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l try to establish the 
result in case of a team with finite p e r i o d s . 
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Proposition 工 工 工 . 4 ： 
With the a s s u m p t i o n s in the p r o p o s i t i o n 111.3 , if T < « , but 
s u f f i c i e n t l y large , there exists a perfect e q u i l i b r i u m such that 
(a*,a*) is the o u t c o m e in each p e r i o d except the last few p e r i o d s . 
Proof: 
The strategy of A and B : 
A A B B 
s : s! = a* s : = a* 
For 0 < t < D 
A B 
s, = a* if b 卜 1 =a* s^ . = a* if = a* 
= 0 if b卜 1 =a* = 0 if a^ ..^  = a* 
For D < t 
A B 
St = a ， i f bt = a* s^ = b , i f a ^ ] = a * 
for all t<T-D for all t<T-D 
= 0 o t h e r w i s e . = 0 o t h e r w i s e 
Where (a’，b’） £ N a s h ( S # , S # ) and 0 < a', 0 < b ' 
What we n e e d to do is to show that for T s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e , 
A B 
there exists D such that (s ,s ) is the p e r f e c t e q u i l i b r i u m 
strategy p a i r . 
Define K^ = m a x GA (S# , S# , a, a* ) Kg = m a x GB (S# , S# , a* , b) 
a b 
GI = - GA(S#,S#,A*,A*) GJ = K^ - GB(S#,S#,A,A*) 
D. = min[ n:G. < n[GA(S#,S#,a•,b’）-U(S#(Q))] } i i 〜 
D2 = min[ niG〕 < n [ G A ( S # , S # , a、 b • ) - U ( S # ( Q ) ) ] } 
D = m a x {Dp D2 } 
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So if at t < D , agent A d e v i a t e s , he w i l l g e t at m o s t G^ , but 
will lose: 
D[GA(a’，b, ,S.#,S#) - U(S#(£) ) ] + (D-1) [GA (a* , a* , S# , S#) - U ( S# (Q) ] • 
So it is n o t w o r t h w h i l e to d e v i a t e . 
Since { a ' ) £ N a s h ( S # , S # ) , A w i l l n o t d e v i a t e in t > D . 
Similarly for a g e n t B . 
P r o p o s i t i o n 1 1 1 . 5 : 
Under the c o n d i t i o n s of p r o p o s i t i o n I工工.4 , there exists an 
incentive s c h e m e w h i c h implements (a*,a*) in each p e r i o d except in 
the last few p e r i o d s . The expected cost of the s c h e m e in each 
period is c l o s e d to that of S#(Q) d e f i n e d in p r o p o s i t i o n I I I . 4 , 
and GA (.,.) = G B ( . , . ) = U . 
Proof: 
It s u f f i c e s if w e can find the i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e stated in the 
p r o p o s i t i o n I I I . 5 . 
Define SA(Q) = U#(Q) + D [ U - G A ( a • b • S # , S # ) ] / T } 
广 
So U { S A ( Q ) ) fa dQ = U(S#(Q)) fa dQ and 
V V 
T 、 
1/T Z { U ( S A ( Q ) ) f(Q;a”b卜）dQ 一 V ( a J }= U 
t=l J “ 
w h e r e {a^., bj.) = (a* , a* ) for t < D 
= ( a ' ) for t > D 
Since U - B A ( a ' ,b’SA,SB) — 0 as T 0 . T h e e x p e c t e d cost of 
T 
SA(Q) and S#(Q) are c l o s e d . S i m i l a r l y , d e f i n e SB(Q) = U " ^ U#(Q) + 
D[U-GB(a’b，，S#,S#)]/T I, the p r o p o s i t i o n is p r o v e d . 
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Conclusion ： 
This chapter has shown how the principal will benefit if 
workers act altruistically rather than in a self—interested w a y . 
M o r e o v e r , if the team relationship is long enough, then each self-
interested worker may behave as if he were altruistic, so that the 
principal will be better off • The implication is that the principal 
should foster an altruistic atmosphere within the team. The 
principal should try to use a long term team rather than many short 
term teams , 
Our conclusion that a team with long-term relationship make 
the principal better off is due to the result that workers would 
behave as if they were a l t r u i s t i c . This is another argument for a 
long-term principal-agent relationship, in addition - to the 
traditional argument of the efficiency_of a repeated principal-
agent r e l a t i o n s h i p from the informational approach of Radnar (50), 
Rubinstein and Yarri (56) , and Lambert (31). Our argument for the 
long term team relationship is similar to that argument of Radnar 
(51), but we study the case of a team of e m p l o y e e , not a 
partneirship g a m e . 
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CHAPTER IV: 
SUBCONTRACTING SYSTEM AND SUPERVISORY S Y S T E M . 
There is an interesting question . Under assumption V I , if 
workers can observe their colleagues‘ ef f o r t , can the principal 
utilize this fact ？ 
One way is that the principal d i r e c t l y contracts S (Q) with 
agent A , and A then employs B • Since A can observe B,s effort, 
A can use a forcing contracting with B . We call this a sub— 
contracting s y s t e m . 
Another way is that the principal still employs the two 
w o r k e r s . He gives S (Q) incentive scheme to A , and A's job is, 
besides giving effort, to report B‘s effort to the p r i n c i p a l . Then 
the p r i n c i p a l pays a fixed income to B o n l y if the reported effort 
is at least equal to the contracted e f f o r t . O t h e r w i s e , the 
principal pays nothing to B. We call this a supervisory s y s t e m . It 
will be proved that the supervisory system is superior to the sub— 
contracting system • A l s o , the s u p e r v i s o r y system is superior to 
the second-best s y s t e m . 
Our model of supervisory system is similar to Ma (35) ,but 
under his m o d e l , he has the assumptions that each worker produces 
a separate output with finite states of p o s s i b l e o u t p u t s , and each 
worker can report o t h e r s ' effort to the p r i n c i p a l . Our model is 
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different in that one team output is p r o d u c e d . There are infinite 
possible states of outcome , and only one agent can report other's 
effort. This is closer to the supervisory system in the real w o r l d . 
To model the sub-contracting system : 
Let A be the sub-boss, if he wants B to supply b , then the income 
he needs to pay is T(b)= U"^ [U +V(b) ] , that is , the minimum 
amount of income required to compensate B for supplying effort b . 
Definition IV.l : 
Let SGA(a,b,S) = U(S(Q)-T(b)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) to be the 
expected utility of the sub-boss given the incentive scheme S(Q), 
and effort a , b . 
Definition IV.2 : 
Define SE(S) to be the effort pair under the sub-contracting system 
given the incentive scheme S ( Q ) . 
(a’，b，） £ SE(S) iff (a’，b，） £ argmax SGA(a,b,S) 
(a,b) 
Remark : 
SE(S) tells us that given the sub-contractor's payoff S(Q), he 
will choose the effort pair to maximize his expected u t i l i t y . 
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Note 工 V . l ： 
i) If A s s u m p t i o n I - V , V I h o l d , then SE(S) . <!> if S (Q) £ C , because 
SGA(a,b,S) is c o n t i n u o u s in a , b . a £ [0,1] , b £ [0,1] • So the 
action set is c o n v e x and c o m p a c t . 
ii) S £ M , then ( a ' ) e SE(S) implies 0 < a' <1 , 0 < b ' < 1 . 
T h e r e f o r e , (a,b) z SE(S) can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by first order 
c o n d i t i o n s . 
Definition 工 工 I . 3 : 
PSC = m a x [ Q - S(Q) ] f(Q:a,b) dQ s u b j e c t to 
a , b ,、 
S(Q),T(Q) 
� 
i) U ( S { Q ) - T { b ) ) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V'(a) = 0 
ii) - U ' ( S ( Q ) - T ( b ) ) T,(b) f(Q;a,b) dQ + 
V 
u， （S(Q)-T(b)) fb(Q;a,b) dQ = 0 
� 
iii) U ( S ( Q ) - T ( b ) ) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) l U 、 
iv) T(b) = U " ^ [ U + V ( b ) ] , 
T’ (b) = V’ （b)/U.(T(b)) 
Remark : 
PSC is the m a x i m u m expected utility the p r i n c i p a l can achieve 
under a s u b - c o n t r a c t i n g s y s t e m . C o n s t r a i n t s i and ii are the 
incentive c o m p a t i b i l i t y constraints w h i c h say that A v o l u n t a r i l y 
chooses the p a i r of e f f o r t s . Constraint iii is that A at least 
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gets the reservation u t i l i t y . Constraint vi is the amount A is 
required to pay B for supplying effort b . 
The following proposition will show some defects of the sub-
contracting s y s t e m . 
Proposition IV.1 : 
Suppose U,,，（.） < 0 , for any action pair (a,b) such that a=b , 
there exists no S (Q) that Ca,b) £ SE(S) and SGA(a,b,S) >_ U • 
Proof: See appendix 9. 
Remark : 
The sub-contracting system seems to be too restrictive and many 
action pairs cannot be i m p l e m e n t e d . 
Definition IV.4 : 
Supervisory System : 
Let A be the s u p e r v i s o r . The supervisory system can be looked as if 
it were a game: 
Stage 1 ) The principal gives A the contract S (Q). 
B gets the following contract :if R(.) > b * , give B T ( b ) , if R(.) 
< b* give B n o t h i n g . 
A , B , supply effort a,b, and A also takes up a report function 
R(.) ： [0,1] - [0,1] . That is, when B s u p p l i e s b , R(b) will be 
r e p o r t e d . 
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stage 2 ) A may use R ( ) taken up in stage 1, or use any other 
report f u n c t i o n . 
If reported effort > b* , then the principal gives A S(Q), give B 
T(b*) 
If reported effort < b* , then the principal gives A S(Q) ,give B 
zero i n c o m e . 
Proposition IV.2 : 
There exists a p e r f e c t equilibrium in the supervisory system such 
that the cost of the principal to implement any (a*,b*) is 
minimized . 
Proof: 
Choose S*(Q) w h i c h minimizes S(Q)f(Q;a*,b*)dQ subject to 
V 
V) U(S(Q)) fa(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V'(a*) = 0 
% 
% 
vi) U{S(Q) ) f ( Q ; a , , b” dQ - V ( a * )丄 U 、 
The strategy of the principal: 
The contract to A : S*(Q) 
The contract to B : if reported effort > b* , then B can get 
U-1 [U+V(b*)] 
if reported effort < h* , then B get 0 
>s 
The expected cost is S*(Q)f(Q,a*,b*)dQ + T(b*) • It is 
obviously the minimum cost to implement the (a*,b*) under the 
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supervisory s y s t e m . It remains to show that (a*,b*)is supported by 
some perfect equilibrium strategy. 
The supporting perfect equilibrium strategy : 
A's strategy :at stage 1, supply a* , and take up the function 
R( ) such that R(b) = b for all b . 
at stage 2 , A does not change to use another report f u n c t i o n . 
B‘s strategy rat stage 1, b* is supplied . 
To prove it is a perfect equilibrium strategy: 
1. For A : a* is the best reply to b* given S*(Q) at stage 1 
2. For A , at stage 2, utility of A is independent of R ( . ) , so 
reporting h o n e s t l y is a weakly dominant s t r a t e g y . 
3. For agent B , given A‘s strategy, b* is the best reply 
if b > b* , V(b) > V { b * ) , 
reward :U(T(b*))-V{b) < U(T(b*))-V(b*) 
if b < b* , reward : 0 -V{b) < O-V(O) 
=0 < U = T(b*)-V(b*) 
So B will never supply any effort less than or more than b* given 
A‘s s t r a t e g y . 
Remark : 
There is a weakness that the equilibrium of the supervisor 
reporting h o n e s t l y is not u n i q u e . He is indifferent between 
reporting h o n e s t l y or n o t . One argument to overcome this , we may 
assume the u t i l i t y function of the supervisor is that for all 
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income, if he reports honestly, his utility will be higher than not 
reporting h o n e s t l y . However this argument is rather tautological. 
Note 工V.2 : 
If the s u p e r v i s o r y game is changed slightly : 
Stage 1 : P r i n c i p a l takes up the reward function : 
A : S*(Q) which is an increasing f u n c t i o n . 
B : if reported effort > b大 , p a y s T(b大) 
if reported effort < b * , pays 0 
Stage 2 : A takes up R(.) the report function .The restriction is 
that once R(.) is taken up, it should be used in the last stage. 
Stage 3 : A and B quit or n o t . If either one of them quits, the 
game ends• 
Stage 4 : If both A and B stay, A supplies effort a , B .supplies 
effort b . 
Stage 5 : Q is r e a l i z e d , A gets S大（Q) 
R(b) is reported , if R(b) > b 大 ， B gets T ( b大） 
if R(b) < b 大 ， B gets zero income 
the u n i q u e perfect equilibrium with no quitting is that 
a大 ' b大 , R大 ( • ) such that R 大 ( b 大 ) = b * • 
Proof： See a p p e n d i x 10. 
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Definition IV.5 : 
PSS = max [ Q - S(Q) ] f(Q;a,b) dQ 一 T(b) subject to 
a, b , 、 
S(Q) 
i) U(S{Q)) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V ( a ) = 0 、 
� 
ii) U{S(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) > U 、 
iii) T(b) = U"^[U+V{b)] 
Remark : 
PSS is the maximum expected profit that the principal can get 
if there is a supervisory system in the t e a m . Constraint i is the 
incentive compatibility constraint on A . C o n s t r a i n t ii means that 
A gets at least the reservation u t i l i t y . Constraint iii is the 
minimum compensation to B . 
Proposition IV.3 : 
PSS PSC 
Proof : 
Let S"(Q) be the optimal incentive scheme under the sub-
contracting system which implements (a",b") , then there exits 
S"(Q) in the supervisory system which implements ,and 
A 广 
S、Q) f ( Q ; a A , b。 d Q > S" (Q) f ( Q ; a、 b。 d Q + T ( b ) . 
•J >> 
To find the S"(Q): 
Define S" (Q) (Q) -T(b^))] 
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So S" satisfies constraints i—iv in the sub—contracting system, 
also implying that S~ satisfies constraints i—iii in the 
supervisory s y s t e m . Also the expected cost of S" (Q) + T(tr) is less 
than the expected cost of S" (Q) because S" (Q) < S I Q ) - T(b) for 
all Q . 
Remark : 
Proposition I V . 3 states that expected u t i l i t y which the principal 
can obtain under a supervisory system is not smaller than that 
obtained under the sub—contracting s y s t e m . The following 
proposition will show why the principal prefers a team with a 
supervisory system to a self-interested team without any 
supervisor that is studied in chapter I I . 
Proposition IV.4 : 
A I , I I ,工工工 i m p l y P S S > PS 
Proof : 
Let be the solution of PS .then (a*,b*) can be 
implemented under a supervisory system by S大 and T ( b * ) , 
、 
and T ( b 大 ) < T大(Q) f d Q because U••(.) < o • 
Proposition IV.5 : 
For (a,b) action pair and a=b, the expected cost of implementing 
it by a s u p e r v i s o r y system is strictly higher than the expected 
cost in an altruistic team. 
Proof: See appendix 11. 
53 
Conclusion ： 
The s u p e r v i s o r y system is superior to the sub-contracting 
system because 
i) all (a,b) pairs can be implemented under the supervisory system; 
ii) under the supervisory s y s t e m , the p r i n c i p a l can take more risk 
than under the sub-contracting system. Because under a sub-
contracting s y s t e m , the sub-boss can shirk in two ways : decreases 
his own effort to yield less disutility of w o r k i n g ,and decreases 
agent B ’s eff o r t level, so that less p a y m e n t n e e d s co be p a i d . 
Therefore a risky incentive scheme is required to maintain high 
effort l e v e l s . U n d e r the supervisory s y s t e m , only the shirking 
problem of the supervisor remains, so a less risky scheme is 
enough. 
A l s o , the s u p e r v i s o r y system utilizes the fact that some workers 
can observe the effort of other w o r k e r s . The information is 
valuable, and it makes the principal strictly b e t t e r off than when 
without this information is not available in the second best team. 
H o w e v e r , the expected cost of implementing a pair of equal 
effort in an altruistic team is strictly lower than in a team with 
supervisory s y s t e m . But for an effort pair in which someone 
supplies m o r e effort than the other, we do not know which system 
has a lower e x p e c t e d cost of implementation • We cannot say which 
system is b e t t e r . 
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CHAPTER V 
TEAM WITH LEADER 
Chapter Ill's argument is that if a long team relationship 
exists, each member is in equal status. Each worker can observe 
other's e f f o r t . So the threat strategy is feasible and no 
information flows out to the principal from the team. 
But in chapter IV, information is allowed to flow to the principal. 
All these rely on Assumption VI • Then the following question 
arises. W h a t will happen if efforts are n o t observable by other 
colleagues? In this chapter, this situation is s t u d i e d . It is a 
common p h e n o m e n o n that in a team or a g r o u p , there is usually a 
leader. W h a t the leader suggests, others w i l l f o l l o w . The following 
will show that if there is such a leader , the principal will be 
strictly better o f f . 
To model the situation of a team with a leader: let A be the 
leader. 
Definition V . l : 
Given the incentive scheme S(Q), T(Q) 
Define b(a) = argmax GB(a,b,S,T) 
b£ [0,1] 
Define L(S,T) : {a*,b*) £ L(S,T) iff a* s a r g m a x GA(a,b(a),S,T) 
as [0,1] 
and b* = b(a*) 
So this L ( S , T ) , is the effort pair that w i l l be carried out if A is 
the team l e a d e r , given S , T . A will order B to carry out b*, and he 
carries out a * . So given a*, B will carry out b* v o l u n t a r i l y . 
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Definition V.2 ： 
£ FL(S,T) iff 1) ( a 大 , b 大 ) £ L(S,T) 
2 ) G A ( a 大 , b 大 ) U 
3) GB(a*,b*) 1 U 
FL(S,T) = if no (a,b) fulfils 1,2,3 
This is the pair of efforts that can be implemented .by the 
incentive systems S,T, in a team with a leader, and each agent gets 
at least the reservation u t i l i t y . 
Definition V.3 : 
PL = max GP(a,b,S,T) subject to 
(a,b),S,T 
(a,b) £ FL(S,T) 
This PL is the maxinrnm expected utility that the principal can 
achieve when he is employing a team in which there is a leader. 
Note V.l : 
To use the first-order approach to characterize the problem ： 
、 
M i n [ S ( Q ) + T ( Q ) ] f(Q;a大，b大）dQ 
subject to ( a 大 , b 大 ) £ FL(S,T) 
that is to find out the least cost schemes that can implement 
( a大， b大） i n a team with l e a d e r . It is equivalent to ： 
、 
M i n [ S ( Q ) + T ( Q ) ] f ( Q ; a , b大） d Q 
subject to : > 
i) U(T(Q)) fb(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V ( b ” = 0 
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ii) U(T(Q)) f(Q;a大，b*) dQ - v(t)大）丄 U 、 
> 
iii) . b* £ argmax U(S(Q)) f(Q;a,b(a)) dQ - V(a) 
b£ [ 0 , 1 ]、 � 
iv) U(S(Q)) f(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V ( a 大 ） 丄 U 
Proposition V.1 : 
Given A I — V , and if (a大，a大）£ Nash(S大，S大）is a stable equilibrium, 
where ( a 大 , b 大 , S 大 , S 大 ) i s the solution of PS, then PL > PS . 
Proof : See appendix 12. 
Remark: 
Proposition VI • 1 state that if there exist a leader in a team, then 
the p r i n c i p a l will be better o f f . But, how will be a leader appear? 
This may be fostered by the principal, or this m a y evolve over the 
time when the team relationship has taken place for a long time. 
Proposition V.2 : 
Let (a* ) be any action pair, then the expected cost of 
implementing it by a team with a leader is strictly greater than 
that under a supervisory s y s t e m . 
Proof ： 
Let A be the leader in the team , and S(Q) and T(Q) be the incentive 
schemes that implement (a,b) with the m i n i m u m expected 
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c o s t . So b’£ ar g m a x U(T{Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(b) • Since S(Q) 
S 
will never be a c o n s t a n t f u n c t i o n , so S(Q) f{Q；a'b') dQ > 
s 
T (a' ) .Now set B to be the s u p e r v i s o r in the s u p e r v i s o r y s y s t e m , and 
give B the i n c e n t i v e scheme T{Q) ； and g i v e A the following 
incentive scheme : give T(a') if r e p o r t e d e f f o r t is g r e a t e r than or 
equal to a’， o t h e r w i s e , n o t h i n g . O b v i o u s l y , the e x p e c t e d cost of 
s u p e r v i s o r y s y s t e m is l o w e r . 
C o n clusion : -
The s u p e r v i s o r y system is superior to a team w i t h leadership 
and the s e c o n d b e s t system in all c a s e s . H o w e v e r ,in the case of an 
action pair in w h i c h A and B supply the same e f f o r t l e v e l , the 
altruistic team is b e t t e r . But in the case of A s u p p l y i n g different 
effort level from B , the s u p e r v i s o r y system m a y be b e t t e r or n o t . 
But it is b e l i e v e d that if B supplies m u c h h i g h e r effort than A 
,then the s u p e r v i s o r y system with A b e i n g the s u p e r v i s o r will be 
better than the a l t r u i s t i c t e a m . 
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C h a p t e r V I 
C o n c l u s i o n of part I 
In p a r t I, we have tried to m o d e l the b e h a v i o u r of 
w o r k e r s in a t e a m . In c h a p t e r II, we h a v e p r o v e d t h a t , if the 
w o r k e r s are s e l f — i n t e r e s t e d , the p r i n c i p a l s h o u l d p r e v e n t agents 
‘from c o m m u n i c a t i n g to c o l l u d e because this m a y r e s u l t in anarchy 
and m a k e the p r i n c i p a l w o r s e o f f . (Proposition 11,4) • This explains 
why the p e r s o n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p in a team ( e s p e c i a l l y a short term 
team ) is u s u a l l y bad • It is b e c a u s e the b a d r e l a t i o n s h i p will 
c o n v i n c e the p r i n c i p a l that no c o m m u n i c a t i o n among workers takes 
p l a c e • T h e p r i n c i p a l can use less h a r s h i n c e n t i v e schemes 
( r e s u l t s in PS ) rather than the i n c e n t i v e schemes that have 
a l r e a d y a s s u m e d w o r k e r s w i l l c o m m u n i c a t e ( r e s u l t s in PCE) • The 
p r i n c i p a l w i l l foster the a l i e n a t i o n a t m o s p h e r e , and this 
a t m o s p h e r e is a P a r e t o e f f i c i e n t s i t u a t i o n . 
In c h a p t e r III, we h a v e proved t h a t if the agents are not 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , but are a l t r u i s t i c , t h e n the p r i n c i p a l will be 
b e t t e r off.( P r o p o s i t i o n III.l ) • M o r e o v e r , we have also proved 
that if the team r e l a t i o n s h i p lasts l o n g e n o u g h , e v e r y o n e in the 
team w i l l p r e t e n d to be a l t r u i s t i c . ( P r o p o s i t i o n 工工工.2,3 )• A l l 
these s u g g e s t that the p r i n c i p a l s h o u l d try to m a k e the team 
r e l a t i o n s h i p last as long as p o s s i b l e . 
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In chapter IV, the role of supervisor is s t u d i e d . It has 
been shown that the existence of a supervisor in a team of self-
interested workers will make the p r i n c i p a l better o f f . ( 
Proposition IV.4 ) • Moreover the subcontracting system is not 
better than the supervisory system. ( Proposition IV.3) . This 
explains why it is usual that in a team, there is a supervisor who 
besides coordinating the workers in a team , should write a report 
to the boss about workers‘ per f o r m a n c e , 
In chapter V , the situation of the existence of a team 
with a leader among workers is also studied • The result is also 
that it w i l l make the p r i n c i p a l better o f f . { Proposition V . I ) . 
Therefore, the principal may help to foster the l e a d e r . -
60 
A P P E N D I X OF P A R T I 
The notes or p r o p o s i t o n s that are not p r o v e d in the text w i l l be 
stated a g a i n in this a p p e n d i x w i t h the p r o o f s . 
A p p e n d i x 1 
Note I.l : 
A s s u m p t i o n 工工工 i v implies i) f(.;a,b) = f ( . b , a ) 
ii) fa(.；a,b) = fb(•；b,a) 
, iii) if a=b, f a ( . ; a , b ) = fb(•；a,b) 
proof: i) f ( Q ; a , b ) 二 lim F ( Q + e ; a , b ) 一 F ( Q ; a , b ) 
e—0 e 
= l i m F ( Q + e ; b , a ) - F ( Q ; b , a ) 
e—0 e 
= f ( Q ; b , a ) 
ii) f a ( Q ; a , b ) = lim f(Q;a+e,b) — f ( Q ; a , b ) 
e—0 e 
= l i m f(Q;b.a+e) - f ( Q ; b , a ) 
e—0 e 
= f b ( Q : b , a ) 
iii) f a ( Q ; a , b ) = f b ( Q , b , a ) , 
if a = b , = fb(Q;a,b) 
A p p e n d i x 2 
Note 工.2 : 
� 
A s s u m p t i o n I I I i i , i i i implies H ( Q ) f a ( Q ; a , b ) d Q > 0 
for (a,b), all H{.) £ M ,and lim H ( Q ) f a { Q ; a , b ) d Q = + « 
a 〜 、 
for all b . 
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proof ： r 、 
H(Q)fa(Q;a,b)dQ = H(Q)dFa(Q;a,b) 
Q 「 
二 Fa(Q,-a,b)H(Q) - Fa (Q; a , b) dH (Q) dQ 
Q J dQ 
Since Fa(Q;ab) = o for all (a,b), Fa(Q,a,b) <_ 0 , 




1 -H{Q)Fa{Q;a,b) > 0 
— r\J 
Since lim Fa(Q;a,b) = - «> 
a—0 
•S 
lim H(Q) fa(Q;a,b)dQ = + oo 
a - 0 、 
This argument is same as Holmstrom {25,p238). 
62 
A p p e n d i x 3 
N o t e 11.2 : 
If S,T 8 C , then N a s h ( S , T ) • ^ 
Proof : 
G A ( S , T , a , b ) is c o n t i n u o u s in a , b 
D e f i n e a(b) = arg m a x G A ( S , T , a , b ) , a £ [0,1] 
a 
By the M a x i m a l F u n c t i o n T h e o r e m , a(b) is u p p e r - s e m i c o n t i n u o u s in 
b . S i m i l a r l y for b ( a ) . 
S o , [ a ( b ) , b(a) ] : [0,l]x[0,l] — [0,l]x [0,1] , is u p p e r - s e m i 
c o n t i n u o u s , By the K a t u a k a t i Fixed P o i n t T h e o r e m , there exist 
{a* ,b*) such t h a t [a(b*) , b(a*) ] = ( a * , b * ) . ( See also chapter 
V I I , lemma V I I . 2 ) 
A p p e n d i x 4 
P r o p o s i t i o n 工工.1 : 
i) If S,T £ M , (a*,b*) e N a s h ( S , T ) , and A I , A I 工 工 ， 
then a G A ( S , T , a * , b” + a GA ( S , T , a* , b* ) > 0 
a a 3 b 
a G B ( S , T , a * , b * ) + Q G B ( S , T . a * , b * ) > 0 
3 a ^ b 
Proof : 
By A I I I v , A I v , v i implies 0 < a * < l , 0 < b * < l 
T h e c o n d i t i o n a* £ a r g m a x G A ( S , T , a , b * ) can b e r e p l a c e d by the 
a£[0,1] 
first order c o n d i t i o n : 3 G A ( S , T , a * , b * ) = 0 
9 a 
Similar for b * . 
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� 
since M A (S , T , a* , b* ) = U (S (Q) ) f b (Q; a* , b* ) dQ > 0 by A工工工 
》 b J 
So, 3 GA( ) + <5 GA ( ) > 0. Similarly for GB ( . ) . 
S a a b 
ii) If a*=b*, (a*,b*) £ Nash(S,T) , AI and A I I I , 
then ^ GA(S,T,a*,b*) + 9 GA(S,T,a*,b*) > 0 
.3 a a b 
B G B ( S , T , a * , b * ) + a GB(S,T,a*,b*) > 0 
9 a 9 b 
Proof: 
^ G A ( S , T , a * , b * ) + 3 GA(S,T,a*,b*) 
9 b % A 
= U { S ( Q ) ) f a ( Q ; a * , b * ) d Q - V'(a*) + U ( S { Q ) ) f b { Q ; a * , b * ) d Q 
� 
= U ( S ( Q ) ) f b ( Q : a * , b * ) d Q 、 
= U ( S { Q ) ) f a ( Q ; a * , b * ) d Q 
= V'(a*) > 0 
Similarly for ^ GB(.) + 3 GB(•) . 
a 3 b 
Appendix 5 
Definition of coalition equilibrium ( I c h i s h i i p.95-96 ) : 
Consider a game of normal form, given the set of players N , 
N 
and hence g i v e n the set of nonempty coalitions of players 2. For 
3 S J 
player j d e n o t e X his strategy set , and d e f i n e X := n X for 
jsS 
N N 
every S 2 . Put X:=X for notational c o n v e n i e n c e . The 
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feasible strategy correspondence of the coalition S is a 
S S S S 
correspondence F : X — X . The subset F(x) of X is 
interpreted as the set of all feasible strategy bundles for S 
1 2 3 n 
as a cooperative u n i t when x : = ( x , x , x , . . , x ) £ X has 
been chosen . It is postulated that the payoff of the jth player 
in S , when the m e m b e r s of S agree to c o o p e r a t e , is represented 
3 S 
by a function u : grF — R . Let r be the set of admissible 
S 
coalition s t r u c t u r e s . The game is now d e f i n e d as a list of the 
the specified data : 
j S N j N 
( f X }, j=l,..,N ; { F }, S £ 2 ； { u }, j £ S £ 2 ； r ). 
A coalitional equilibrium is a pair c o n s i s t i n g of a strategy 
bundle and an a d m i s s i b l e coalitional structure ( x* , T* ) z XxF 
j t 
such that i) each t £ T * , x * : n ( x * ) s F (x*) 
jst 
N 
ii) it is not true that for some S £ 2 , there 
S S j S 
exist f £ F (x*) for w h i c h u (x*,f ) > 
j T{j)* 
u (X*, X ) for every j £ S where T{j) 
T{j) 
is member of T* such that j £ T ( j ) . 
Condition i signifies the feasibility c o n d i t i o n . The term 
j S 
u ( X*,/ ) of c o n d i t i o n ii is the payoff that player j would get 
S 
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by participating in the new coalition S and agreeing to take 
S 
the strategy f . Here he passively accepts the strategies 
j T(j)* 
currently taken by the players outside S . The term u ( x * ) 
S 
is the payoff he currently enjoys. Condition ii signifies, 
therefore the stability condition. 
Appendix 6 
Proposition 工工.3 : 
1) S(Q), T(Q) £ M , then CE(S,T) = ^ 
2) for all (a,b) such that a=b, implies (a,b) i CE(S,T) for all 
S , T • 
Proof of 1 : _ 
i) (a,b) £ CE(S,T) implies (a,b) £ PO(S,T,h) for some h , 
such that 0 <h <1. Otherwise , {A,B} coalition w i l l achieve higher 
payoff to both by changing strategy. 
ii) (a,b) £ CE(S,T) implies (a,b) e N a s h ( S , T ) , otherwise 
either {A} or {BI w i l l benefit by d e v i a t i o n . 
iii) N a s h ( S , T ) n PO(S,T, h ) = 中 for all h such that 0<h<l 
Proof of 2 : 




Proposition 工工工.1 ： 
If Assumptionsl-V hold, then PC > PS 
Proof : 
i) Let (a*,a*,S*,S*) to be the solution to PS , there exists 
S#(Q) such that (a*,a*) £ C ( S # , S # ) , 
and S*(Q) f{Q;a*,a*) dQ > S#(Q) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ 
J 、 
Proof : 
By the necessary conditions 1,3,6 of the second best p r o b l e m , 
1) S*(Q) = U [1/ u* + w* f a ( Q ; a * , b * ) ] 
f ( Q ; a * -
2) U{S*(Q)) fa(Q;a*,a*) dQ - V'(a*) = 0 
3) U(S* (Q) ) f {Q;a*,a*) dQ - V(a*) 二 y： 
、 
Now to find the function S#(Q) . Let S#(Q) to the S(Q) such 
that it minimize S(Q) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ subject to 
A 广 




5) U{S(Q)) f{Q;a*,b*) dQ - V{a*) > U 
since fa(.;a*,a*) = fb(.,.a*.a*) by ( A . I l l 乂 - , the condition a) 
can be replaced by : 
4) 2 U(S(Q)) fa(Q;a*,a*) dQ - V'(a*) = 0 
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So by the necessary conditions : 
6) S#(Q) = U'"^ [1/ u# + w# f a , b * ) ] where u# and w# are 
f(Q,.a*,b*) 
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with condition 5 and 4 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
7) 2 U(S#(Q)) fa{Q;a*,a*) dQ -V，（a*) = 0 
沪 � 
8) U(S#(Q)) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ - V(a*) = U 、 
We claim : 
i) > 0 , 
O t h e r w i s e , S*(Q) , S#(Q) will be decreasing or constant function. 
Then U{S*(Q)) fa dQ < 0 , U(S#(Q)) fa dQ < 0 , which 
V � 
contradict to 2 and 7 because V’ （a*) > 0 . 
ii) w* / w# 
Suppose not , w* =w# • Then S* = U‘[1/ u* + w* f a ( Q ; a * , b * ) ] 
f(Q;a*,b*) 
and 
S# = / u# + fa(Q;a*,b*) ] with conditions 3,8, 
f(Q;a*,b*) 
implies u* = u#• 
� 
So S*(Q) = S#(Q) . But from 2, U(S*(Q)) fa dQ = V (a*). 
S � 
So 2 U(S#(Q)) fa dQ = 2V'(a*) , contradicts to 8. 、 
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iii) u* + w* fa(Q;a*,b*) = U'(S*(Q)) > 0 for all Q • 
f(Q;a*,b*) 
u# + w# fa(Q;a*.b*) = IT (S#(Q)) > 0 for all Q . 
f(Q;a*,b*) 
Follow from 1 and 6 , and U ’ （ . ） > 0 . 
iv) There exists only one Q such that 
S* (Q) < S#(Q) for all Q < Q 
S*(Q) > S#(Q) for all Q > Q 
To find Q , it is only necessary to find Q such that 
f a_(Q; a* , a* ) = u# - u* . Since f a (Q: .) is a strictly increasing 
f ( Q ; a * , a * ) w # - w * f(Q；•) 
function, Q is u n i q u e . . 
For all Q < Q , fa (Q; . ) < ii# - u* 
f(Q;.) w# - w* 
Q > Q r fa(Q;.) > u# — u* 
f(Q;.) w# - w* 
Since w* w# , it is either w* > w# or w* < is t r u e . 
A) If w* < V7# 
for all Q < Q , u* + w* fa(Q;.) > u# + w# fa(Q;.) 
f(Q；.) f(Q；.) 
Q > Q , u* + w* fa(Q;.) < u# + w# fa(Q;.) 
f(Q； .) f(Q；.) 
Since U''(.) < 0 , this and (iii) imply that 
for all Q < Q , S*(Q) > S#(Q) 
Q > Q , S*(Q) < S#(Q) 
Q = Q , S M Q ) = S#(Q) 
Define U* (Q) = U(S* (Q) ) , U#(Q) = U(S#(Q) ) , G( • ) = U"^ ( . ) • 
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Since U ' { . ) > 0 and U ' ' ( . ) < 0 , G,(.) > 0 , G' ' { , ) > 0. 
It will prove that w* > w# w i l l cause c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
Claim : there exist S"(Q) such that S"(Q) satisfies condition 
r r 
4 and 5 , and S^(Q) f(Q,a*,a*) dQ < S#(Q) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ • 
J J 
Proof: Define S、Q) = G [ 1/2 U* (Q) + 1/2 EU* ] 
where EU* = U M Q ) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ , so is a c o n s t a n t , 、 
a) S"(Q) satisfies 5 : 
U(S^(Q)) f dQ - V(a*) 
� 
= U(G[l/2 U M Q ) + 1/2 EU*] ) f dQ - V(a*) 、 
= [1/2 U M Q ) + 1/2 EU*] f dQ - V(a*) 
= E U * ( Q ) - V{a*) = U 
b) S" satisfies 4 : 
2 U(S^(Q)) fa dQ - V’ (a*) 
� 
= 2 U(G[l/2 U M Q ) + 1/2EU*] ) fa dQ - V，（ a ” 
N 
r r 
= 2 1/2 U M Q ) fa dQ + 2 1/2 EU* fa dQ - V ' (a*) 
J ^ 
Since EU*(Q) is a constant, and fa{Q;a,b)dQ = 0 for all (a'b) 








= G[l/2 U*(Q) + 1/2 EU*] f(Q;a*,b*) dQ 
< { 1/2G[U*(Q)] + 1/2 G[ U*(Q)fdQ] } f(Q;a*,a*) dQ 、 
b e c a u s e G''>0 
广 广 
< 1/2 S*(Q) f dQ + 1 / 2、 G(U*(Q)) f d Q by the Jensen 
N/ � 
i n e q u a l i t y 
= 1 / 2 S M Q ) f dQ + 1/2 S M Q ) f dQ 
、 
= S M Q ) f d Q 
广 ‘ 
< S # ( Q ) f d Q 
The last i n e q u a l i t y can be proved in the similar w a y of (v) in the 
following. 
So the e x i s t e n c e of S" (Q) satisfies condition 4 and 5 with a lower 
expected v a l u e than S#(Q) • Hence S#(Q) is n o t the solution to the 
minimization p r o b l e m . The contradiction is e s t a b l i s h e d . It is not 
true that w* < w# 
B) > w# 
for all Q < Q , u* + w* fa(Q;.) < u# + w# fa(Q;•) 
f(Q；.) f ( Q ； . ) 
Q > Q , u* + w* fa(Q;.) > u# + w# fa(Q;•) 
f(Q；.) f(Q；.) 
71 
So for all Q < Q , S*(Q) < S#(Q) 
Q > Q r S M Q ) > S#(Q) 
Q = Q , S*(Q) = S#(Q) 
The claim iv) is p r o v e d . 
’ 广 
V) S M Q ) f (Q;a*,a*) dQ > S#(Q) f ( Q ; a * , a” dQ 
� 
Proof: 
From iv) there is Q such that for all Q < Q , U*(Q) < U#(Q) 
Q > Q , U^(Q) > U#(Q) 
P 
From 3 and 8 , U M Q ) f dQ = U#(Q) f dQ 
S*(Q) f dQ - S#(Q) f dQ 
V � 
= G[U* (Q) ] f dQ - G[U#(Q)] f dQ ' 
>J � 
fQ r 
= { G [ U M Q ) ]-G[U#(Q) ] 1 f dQ + {G [ U M Q ) ]-G [U# (Q) ]| f dQ 
J J Q 
「3 f 
> G ' [U#(Q) ] [U* (Q)-U#(Q) ] f dQ + [U#(Q)] [ U M Q ) - U # ( Q ) ] f dQ 
J 一 J Q 
F Q 「 
> G’ [U#(Q) ] [ U M Q ) - U#(Q) ] f dQ + Gi [U#(Q)] [ U M Q ) - U # ( Q ) ] f dQ 
J J Q � 
= G,[U#(Q)] f U M Q ) - U#(Q)} f dQ 
= 0 
So (I) is p r o v e d . 
工 工 ） P C 丄 GP(a*,a*,S#,S#) > GP(a*,a*,S*,S*) = P S . 
The p r o p o s i t i o n is p r o v e d . 
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Appendix 8 
Proposition 工工工 . 2 ： 
Given S# defined in the proposition 工工工.1 ,if Assumption 
I , I I , I I I | , I V , V , then i) there exists an action pair 
(a'b’) £ Nash(S#,S#) 
and a* > 0 , b ' > 0 . 
ii) (0,0) £ Nash(S#,S#) 
‘ iii) G A ( a i , S # , S # ) > GA(0,0,S#,S#) 
GB(a，，b’，S#,S#) > G B ( 0 , 0 , S # , S # ) 
Proof: 
ii) Since F(Q;0,b) = 1 for all b . So if A supplies zero effort, the 
outcome w i l l certainly to be Q regardless of what effort B 
supplies. 
U(S#(Q)) - V(b) < U(S#(Q)) - V(0) for all b > 0. 
So , 0 is a best reply to 0 .Given A gives no e f f o r t , B should give 
no e f f o r t . The situation is similar for A when B supplies no 
effort. 
i) Let e > 0, b u t less then 1. 
Define N a s h ( S # , S # , e ) : (a*,b*) s Nash(S#,S#,e) iff 
a* 8 [e,l], b* £ [e,l], a* t argmax G A ( a , b * , S # , S # ) , 
a£ [e,l] 
and b* t argmax G B ( a * , b , S # , S # ) . ‘ 
b£ [e,l] 
Claim 1: N a s h ( S # , S # , e ) is non-empty for all e , 
Proof: Standard result in game theory : Payoff functions are 
c o n t i n u o u s . The action set is convex and c o m p a c t . 
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Claim 2. For e sufficiently small, (a*,b*) e Nash(S#,S#,e〉 implies 
a*,b* are strictly greater than e. 
Proof : Suppose not , there exists (e,b*) s N a s h ( S # , S # , e ) , then 、 
U(S#(Q)) fa(Q,e,b*) dQ -V’（e) < 0 , 
� 
But since S#(Q) is increasing function , b* 2l e > 0 
By A 工 工 工 l i m U(S#(Q)) fa(Q,e,b*)dQ = + - , 
e — 0、 
By AIv lim V (e) = 0 
e—0 
50 for e sufficiently s m a l l , U(S#(Q)) f(Q;e,b*) dQ - V ' ,(e) > 
0 , have a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . So for e sufficiently small, a * > e , 
b * > e . 
From claim 1,2 i) is p r o v e d . 
iii) Since S#(Q) is an increasing function , by AIII'v , there 
exists a* which is sufficiently close to z e r o , and 、 
U(S#(Q)) f ( Q ; a * ) dQ - V(a*) > U(S#(g；) - V(0) 
51 
Since (a',b’) s N a s h ( S # , S # ) , 
U{S#(Q)) f(Q;a',b丨）dQ - V(a') 
� 
> U(S#(Q)) f(Q;a*,b') dQ - V(a*) 、 
> U{S#(Q)) - V(0) 
' V - X 
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A p p e n d i x 9 
P r o p o s i t i o n IV.1 : 
Suppose U … （ • ） < 0 , for any action p a i r (a,b) such that a=b , 
there exists no S(Q) that (a,b) £ SE(S) and S G A ( a , b , S )丄 U . 
Proof: 
Suppose n o t , that is ,there exists a S such t h a t (a,b) s SE(S) and 
SGB(a,b,S) 2l U . 
1 . By (iii) of D e f i n i t i o n 工工工.3 
U ( S ( Q ) - T ( b ) f (Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) >. U 
= U ( T ( b ) ) - V(b) , since' a=b, V ( a ) = V(b) 、 
U ( S ( Q ) - T ( b ) ) f(Q;a,b) d Q l U ( T ( b ) ) 
*m 
2. a=b , f a ( Q ; a , b ) = fb(Q;a,b) 
By D e f i n i t i o n 工工1.3.i and ii, U， （（S(Q)-T(b)) f(Q;a,b) dQ 
= U，（ T ( b ) ) 
3 . U’，（ .） < 0 a n d 1 . 
� 
[S{Q)-T(b)] f(Q;a,b) dQ > T(b) 
SI 
U'( [S(Q)-T(b)] f(Q;a,b) dQ } < U ' ( T ( b ) ) 
S 
Since U … （ • ） < 0 、 
U,{ [ S ( Q ) - T ( b ) ]丨 f(Q;a,b) dQ 
S 
< u'( [S{Q)-T(b)] f(Q;a,b) dQ } 
� 
< U’（T(b)) , c o n t r a d i c t i n g to 2 . 
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A p p e n d i x 10 
C l a i m of Note IV.2 : 
The u n i q u e p e r f e c t e q u i l i b r i u m w i t h no q u i t t i n g is that a * , b * , 
R M . ) such that R* (b*) = b * . 
P r o o f : 
1 . A w i l l n e v e r take any R ( . ) such that there exist b ‘ < b* and 
R ( b ' ) = b * . S u p p o s e n o t , then B's b e s t r e p l y is some b~ < b‘ < b * . 
But U = U ( S * ( Q ) ) f(Q;a*,b*) dQ - V(a*) 、 
> U { S ( Q ) ) f(Q,a,b*) dQ- V(a) 、 
> U(S (Q) ) f ( Q , a , b” dQ - V(a) for all a 
So A w i l l quit in stage 3 
2 . If R ( . ) is such that R (b) < b* i m p l i e s b > b * , then a g e n t B 
w i l l q u i t in stage 3 . 
Since B's m a x i m u m u t i l i t y = max{ 0, U ( T ( b * ) ) - V ( b ) , - V ( b * ) } 
< U ( T ( b * ) ) - V ( b * ) = U 
3 . The r e p o r t R ( b * ) = b * , R(b) < b* if b < b* , is the o n l y r e p o r t 
s t r a t e g y such that A and B w i l l not q u i t in stage 3. 
4 . G i v e n R ( b * ) = b * , (a*,b*) is the b e s t r e p l y of A and B 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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Appendix 11 
Proposition IV.5 : 
For (a,b) action pair and a=b, the expected cost of implementing it 
by a supervisory system is strictly higher than the expected cost 
in an altruistic t e a m . 
Proof: 
Under the s u p e r v i s o r y system , let the incentive scheme be S (Q) and 
T ( b ) . The p r o p o s i t i o n will be proved if there exist a S‘(Q) such 
that it satisfies the constraints : 
i) 2 S'(Q) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V'(a) = 0 
� 
ii) U(S(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ - V(a) > U 
V 
and 2 S'(Q) f(Q;a,b) dQ < S(Q) f(Q;a,b) dQ + T(b) 
Let S' (Q) = U"^ [1/2 U(S{Q) )+ 1/2 U ( T { a ) ) ] 
Since S(Q) is the incentive scheme of the supervisor ,it 
satisfies : 
� 
ii) U(S(Q)) fa(Q;a,b) dQ - V'(a) = 0 、 
and iv) U(S(Q)) f(Q;a,b) dQ 
= U - V(a) 
= U ( T ( a ) ) 
So U(S'(Q)) fa dQ = 1/2 U(S(Q)) fa dQ 
� 
= 1 / 2 V’ （ a )； 
U(S'(Q)) f dQ - V(a) 
� 
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= 1 / 2 U(S(Q)) f dQ + 1/2 T(a) -V(a) 、 
= 1 / 2 T(a) + 1/2 T(a) - V(a) 
= U 
Now give the incentive scheme S，（Q) to both A and B . Under an 
altruistic t e a m , the (a,b) will be the action pair i m p l e m e n t e d . 
it remains to show that it has lower expected c o s t . 
Let U M Q ) = U{S (Q) ) , G(.) = U'^ [.] 
G ' ' ( . ) > 0 because U''(.) < 0 
2 G(l/2 U M Q ) + 1/2 U(T(a) ) < G ( U M Q ) ) + G(U(T(a))) 、 
2 S'(Q) f(Q;a,b) dQ 
V 
= 2 G(l/2 U M Q ) + 1/2 U{T{a) ) f (Q;a,b) dQ 
< G ( U M Q ) ) f {Q;a,b) dQ + G{U(T(a))) 、 
� 
< G(U*(Q) f(Q;a,b,) dQ + T(a) 、 
= S(Q) f(Q;a,b) dQ + T(b) 
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A p p e n d i x 1 
P r o p o s i t i o n V . 1 : 
Given A工一V, and if (a*,a*) £ N a s h ( S * , S * ) is a s t a b l e e q u i l i b r i u m , 
where (a*,b*,S*,S*) is the solution of P S , then PL > PS . 
Proof : 
It will s u f f i c e if there are S~(Q),T-(Q) such that 
(a*,a*) £ F L ( S 、 T ” ； and 
[S-'(Q) + T"{Q) ] f ( Q ; a * , a” dQ 
V 
< [ S M Q ) + S M Q ) ] f 、 
To find s u c h S" and T"： 
D e f i n e T " ( Q ) = S* (Q) ‘ 
So c o n s t r a i n t s in N o t e V.l is s a t i s f i e d . 
、 
Given i : U ( S M Q ) ) fb(Q;a*,a*) dQ 一 V ' (a*) = 0 
^ 广 
D e f i ne K = <9b(a) I 二 - I U ( S M Q ) ) f a b ( Q ; a、 b * ) dQ } / 
3 a a* J 
{ U ( S * ( Q ) ) f b b ( Q ; a * , b * ) dQ - V " ( A * ) } 、 
Since it is a s s u m e d that (a*,a*) is stable N a s h e q u i l i b r i u m , 
0 < K < 1 . 
C o n s t r a i n t iii of N o t e V . l can be r e p l a c e d by the first order 
c o n d i t i o n : 
U { S ( Q ) ) f a ( Q ; a * , b { a * ) ) d Q 
s 
+ U ( S ( Q ) ) £ b ( Q ; a N b ( a M ) a ) b ( a ) d Q - V (a*) = 0 
^ a a* 
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. ._ - — . 
Since b(a*)=a* , fa(Q;.) = fb{Q;.) 
iii of note V.l is equivalent to 
iii’） (1+K) U(S(Q) fa(Q;a*,a*) dQ - V (a*) = 0 
� 
To find S"(Q) . Define S"(Q) to be the S(Q) which 
,min S(Q) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ subject to : 
iii') (1+K) U(S(Q)) fa(Q;a*,a*)dQ - V’（a*) = 0 、 
iv) U(S(Q)) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ - V(a*) > U 、 
Similar to the proof of the proposition 工工I.l, it 
can be shown that S"(Q) f(Q;a*,a*) dQ < S* f{Q;a*,a*) dQ 
� 
So, [ S"(Ql+T"(Q) ] f(Q;a*,a*) dQ 
< C S*(Q) + S*(Q) ] f(Q;a*,a*) dQ 、 
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P A R T工工 
Chapter VII 
Model I: 1 agent 
The agent chooses an action a £ A , where A is the set of all 
actions that the agent can c h o o s e . For example, a can be looked as 
a vector of activities of the agent : a = ( works 10 h o u r , gives 
high effort level, reports h o n e s t l y , uses 100 units of raw 
materials) . Then the action taken by the agent affects the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of some outcome from the outcome s p a c e . Denote X the 
outcome s p a c e , and x a generic element of X . X can be interpreted 
as the collection of all possible s i g n a l s . For e x a m p l e , x = {$100 
profit ,the quantity of o u t p u t s , the quality of o u t p u t s , reported 
from other agents) . Define n { ) : X — R to be the projection of X on 
to m o n e t a r y o u t c o m e . Then for the x in the above example , n ( x ) = 
$100 .The u t i l i t y of the agent depends on the income he gets and 
the action he has taken. The utility of the p r i n c i p a l depends on 
the m o n e t a r y outcome minus the payment to the a g e n t . 
Definition: 
Let X be our outcome set, define r to be the Borel a-algebra of X , 
which is the smallest a-algebra containing all the closed subsets 
of X . So { X,r) is a measurable s p a c e . 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
we say a f u n c t i o n p is a p r o b a b i l i t y m e a s u r e on r if it is a 
n o n n e g a t i v e set f u n c t i o n d e f i n e d on r and has the following 
properties : i) p ( 中 ） = 0 w h e r e 否 is the n u l l s e t . 
oo oo 
ii) p ( U Ei) = Z p(Ei) for Ei £ r , Ei n Ej = 否 
i=l i=l 
iii) p(X) = 1 
We denote p { . | a ) to be the p r o b a b i l i t y m e a s u r e on r w h e n action a 
is taken by the a g e n t . 
A s s u m p t i o n I : 
i) A is c o m p a c t . 
ii) X is a c o m p a c t , s e p a r a b l e m e t r i c s p a c e . 
iii) lim p (E | aj^ ) = p (E | a) for all E £ r 
ak—a 
iv) The u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of the agent : H ( i n c o m e , a ) : RxA - R , H 
is c o n t i n u o u s ,M = sup [ |H(y,a) |: |y| S K , a £ A } < «, where y 
is the i n c o m e of the agent 
V) The u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n to the p r i n c i p a l : U (m - y): R — R 
where m is the m o n e t a r y o u t c o m e , y is the i n c o m e paid to the 
a g e n t . U(.) is a s s u m e d to be c o n t i n u o u s , and L=sup[ U ( m - y ) : m = 
n(x) for some x e X , |y| < K } < w h e r e K is some c o n s t a n t 
p o s i t i v e n u m b e r . 
vi) H is the r e s e r v a t i o n u t i l i t y of the a g e n t . T h e r e exists a 
number y‘ w i t h that jy'! < K and a‘ e A such that H ( y ' , a ' ) > H . 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
D e f i n e @ = { S ： S is a c o l l e c t i o n of s u b s e t s of X , and fi a a-
algebra} . So £ £ @ implies fi^ r . 
Each S is an i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m that tells us w h a t o u t c o m e may be 
o c c u r r i n g . 
For e x a m p l e , w h e n X = [ 0 , 1 ] x [ 0 , 1 ] , the first c o o r d i n a t e r e p r e s e n t s 
the q u a n t i t y of the o u t p u t s , the second c o o r d i n a t e r e p r e s e n t s the 
a v e r a g e q u a l i t y of the o u t p u t s . One of the i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s is 
that it just tells w h a t the a v e r a g e q u a l i t y is r e a l i z e d . A n o t h e r 
m a y just tell the q u a n t i t y of o u t p u t s . The l a r g e s t i n f o r m a t i o n 
system is the one that tells the q u a n t i t y as w e l l as the q u a l i t y . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
An e x t e n d e d r e a l - v a l u e d f u n c t i o n d e f i n e d on X is said to be 
S — m e a s u r a b l e if the set { x : f (x) < a } £ S for all real n u m b e r a . 
For e x a m p l e , if u s i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m of " q u a n t i t y " , the 
o n l y i n c e n t i v e scheme t h a t can be u s e d is w h i c h p a y m e n t to the 
agent d e p e n d s on the q u a n t i t y o n l y . A n y o t h e r i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e 
w h o s e r e w a r d s d e p e n d on q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y is not f e a s i b l e u n d e r 
this i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m . 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
K S = ( f ： f is S一 m e a s u r a b l e , |f (x) | ^ K < oo f o r a l l x e X } 
The KS is the set of all feasible i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e s given the 
i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m . 
The K is the m a x i m u m a m o u n t that the p r i n c i p a l can pay to or charge 
the a g e n t . T h i s exists b e c a u s e there may be l e g a l c o n s t r a i n t , or 
the b a n k r u p t c y c o n s t r a i n t ,of the p r i n c i p a l and the a g e n t , etc.(See 
S h a p p i n g t o n (59)). 
R e m a r k : 
KS ^  KH ' if SSi £ 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
D e f i n e 5(f,f，） = sup |f(x) - f'(x) 
X £ X 
N o t e this 5 is a m e t r i c for all K£ 
i) 5(f,f,) = 0 i m p l i e s sup |f(x) - f'(x)| = 0 
X £ X 
so implies f(x) - f'(x) = 0 for a l l x £ X 
and f (x) = f，（X) for all x £ X , or e q u i v a l e n t l y 
f = f ' for f,f' £ kfi . 
ii) 5(f,f') = sup |f(x) 一 f"(x) + f"(x) 一 f•(x) 
X £ X 
^ sup |f(x) - f"(x)I + sup |f"(x) - f•(x) 
X 8 X X £ X 
= 5 ( f , f " ) + 5(f",f，） 
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iii) 5(f,f • ) ^ 0 for all f,f ' s Kfi 
iv) 5(f,f') = 5(f',f) for all f,f' £ KS 
Therefore ( KS,5) is a metric space. 
Lemma VII.l : 
For all S £ KS is c o m p a c t . 
T o prove the lemma, we need two propositions . 
Proposition (Roydan 7 . 2 5 ) : 
A metric space is compact if and only if it is both complete and 
totally b o u n d e d . 
Proposition (Roydan 1 1 . 6 ) : 
Let < fn > be a sequence of ^ - m e a s u r a b l e functions, then sup f^ , 
inf fjj , lim f^ are also ^ - m e a s u r a b l e . 
Proof of lemma VII.l : 
1) claim : KS is c o m p l e t e , that is , let < f^ ^ > be a Cauchy 
sequence £ K£ and 5 (f^^, f^ )^ < a for all n,in ^ N(a) . The f^ converges 
pointwise at each x £ X to some function f £ KS . 
proof : F i r s t , construct a subsequence < f^ k > by the following 
procedure : 
Choose fjji such that nl ^ N(l) and ⑴）< 1 
fn2 such that n2 ^ max (nl, N (1/2) ) , and 5(fnl'fn2) < 
fnk ' with nk ^ m a x (nk-1, N (1/k) ) , and 5 (f^乂，f^k-l) < 
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since this sequence < t^^ > converges pointwise to some function, 
say f £ KS ,because lim 5 (f^ j^^ , f) = 0, that is lim | f ( x ) - f (x) |=0 
nk nk 
at each x £ X . 
Since f = lim f^^” f^ j^^  is S-measurable , and | f^ j^^  (x) K at 
n k 吻 
each X. By R o y d a n 11.6 f is S-measurable and |f(x)| S K, so 
f £KS. 
S i n c e 5 ( f n , f )么 + 5(f 
lim 5(fn,f) ^ lim + lim 5(f 
n - ^ n,nk 〜 n - ^ 
= 0 + 0 =0 
Therefore, f^ converges pointwise to f. 
ii)ClaimrKS is totally b o u n d e d . -
Definition( R o y d a n p.154) : 
A metric space is totally bounded if for each a > 0, there is a 
finite collection of points of [x^, . . .Xj^ } such that each x £ X is 
within a d i s t a n c e less than a of one of Xj^. This is equivalent to 
say that for each a > 0 , the space X is covered by a finite number 
of balls of radius a . 
To prove KB is totally bounded : 
Suppose K& were not totally bounded, that i s , for all finite 
collection { f^, , . . . }, there exist a f £ KS such that 5 (f > 
a for all i = l , • • , n . 
Denote = { f E KS : 5(f,f•) < a/2 } 
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Choose a fi £ KS , 
then take a f〗£ 0-
k-1 
then take a fj^  £ KS\ U 0-
i=l 
N 
If the sequence stops at some N , this means that KS \ U 0： = 
i = l 
the claim is p r o v e d . 
If the sequence is infinite, then take a subsequence < f^ k^ > such 
that 5(fni,fn2) < 5(£„1,£。3) 
5(fni'fnk) < 5(fni,fnk+i) for all ni < n k . 
The subsequence has infinite number of terms. O t h e r w i s e , the claim 
is p r o v e d . But for nk > 2k/a , 5 ( f , f > K , contradicts the fact 
that sup { 5 (f , f ' ) :f,f’ £ <_ K } , so the claim is p r o v e d . ^ 
This compactness of KS is essential in proving the existence 
theorem V I I . l . 
Corollary : 
KS is s e p a r a b l e . 
Definition : 
Let f £ K S , a £ A , define G(f,a) = H(f(x),a) p(dx|a) 
.X 、 
F(f,a) = U(n(x) - f(x)) p(dx|a) 
、X 
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So G(f,a) is the expected utility of the agent when the principal 
gives the incentive scheme f and the agent plays action a. F(f,a) 
is the expected utility of the principal. 
Remark : 
Since f £ KS implies f £ KF , all the property of f £ Kr can be 
applied to all f £ Kfi. 
Lemma V工工.2 : 
Let fjj — f, a^j — a, fj^  £ Kr for all n , then 
i) G(f,a) = lim 
ii) F(f,a) = lim F (fj^n, a^ )^ 
n-^ x) 
To prove the lemma, we need the General Convergence Theorem: 
Theorem(Roydan 11.7): 
Let (X,r) be any measurable space, < P^ > a sequence of measures 
that converge set wise to a measure u ； and < f^ > and < g > two 
sequences of measurable functions that converge pointwise to f 
and g . Suppose that | f^j |：< g and that lim g dPn = g dP <<» 
•• N^ J 
% 广 
Then lim f^ ^ dPn = f dP . 
n 〜 J 、 
Proof of lemma VII.2 
i) 1： Define H^(x) = H(f^ (x) , a^ )^) 
fjj (x) is r-measurable iff { x : f (x) ^ a } £ r for all a . 
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So, given a。，{ x : H^ (x) ^ a } iff ( x : f (x) ^ H |aj^(a) } 
T h e r e f o r e , H^ ^ ( . ) is r-measurable . 
2: Note that | Hjj(x) | 丄 M < oo for all n by assumption I. iv 
3: By assumption I.iii, p{ . la^ )^ - p ( . | a ) , and 
lim M p (dx I a) = M lim p(dx|ajj) 
n〜 Jx n〜 Jx � 
= M lim 1 = M p(dx|a) 
n-<« Jx 
4: M can be looked as the < g > in R o y d a n , and < Hj^  > to be 
< fn >• 
5: All the conditions of Roydan 11.7 is f u l f i l l e d , so 
lim H (f jj, aj^ ) p{dx|ajj) = | H(f,a) p ( d x | a ) 
n-« J J 
Or e q u i v a l e n t l y , 
lim G(fn,an) = G(f,a) 
n-« • 
ii) it can be p r o v e d in a similar way • D e f i n i n g Ujj(x) = U ( n ( x ) -
fjj(x) )• Since n and f^ ^ are r-measurable , the function n(x) 一 f (x) 
is also r - m e a s u r a b l e . (x) | L < oo, lemma 工工.2i follows 
immediately from R o y d a n 1 1 . 1 7 . • 
This c o n t i n u i t y of G(.) and F(.) is i m p o r t a n t in all the following 
p r o o f s . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of continuity is that when the action of 
the agent and incentive scheme change s l i g h t l y , the expected 
utility of the p r i n c i p a l and the agent w i l l also only change 
s l i g h t l y . 
90 
D e f i n i t i o n ： 
A*T (F) = { a' £ A : G ( a ' , f) > G(a,f) - X for all a 8 A } w h e r e x is 
a n u m b e r > 0 . 
R e m a r k : 
A*o(f) is the full r a t i o n a l agent‘s action g i v e n the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme f. A*T(f) is the a c t i o n of the a g e n t of b o u n d e d r a t i o n a l i t y 
of T if t > 0 . 
L e m m a V I I . 3 : 
i) A*i: (f) is n o n - e m p t y for all f e K r , 
ii) if a^ £ A*T (fJJ) , a^ ^ — a , f^ — f , then a £ A*T ( f ) . 
proof : 
i) T r i v i a l . 
ii) Suppose n o t , that is a £ A * t ( f ) , then there exists a s A and 
G(a,f) > G (a, f) . C o n s t r u c t the s e q u e n c e < (a, f^ )^ >. 
BY lemma V I I . 2 , lim G ( a , f^ )^ = G(a,f) 
n 〜 
> G(a,f) = lim Gia^rf^) - x 
n"*oo 
S o , lim G(a,fjj) > lim 
T h e r e f o r e , for n s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e , G (a, f^ )^ > G (a^^, f - x , 
c o n t r a d i c t s the a s s u m p t i o n a^ ^ z A*x (f^ )^ . • 
Lemma V I I . 3 tells us that w h e n two i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e s are s i m i l a r , 
then a c t i o n s i m p l e m e n t e d by the two s c h e m e s are also s i m i l a r . 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
Rt(f) = f a : a £ A * t ( f ) and G(a,f) ^ H - x } 
=少 if for all a £ A*T(f) , G ( a , f ) < H - x 
This RT (F) is the a c t i o n the can be i m p l e m e n t e d by the i n c e n t i v e 
scheme f g i v e n that agent is s a t i s f i e d w i t h e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y of the 
m a x i m u m m i n u s t . 
Lemma V I I . 4 : 
If ajj £ RT:(fn) , ajj — a , fn — f, then a £ R t (f). 
Proof : 
AN and a^ £ RT (f) implies ^ E - x . 
By lemma V I I . 2 , G ( a , f ) = lim f^) > H - x, and this together 
with lemma V I I . 3 , a s Rt(f). _ 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
CtS = { (f,a) : a ^ <!> , f £ KE , a £ Rx (f) } 
This is the set of all p a i r s of actions a n d i n c e n t i v e schemes such 
that the a c t i o n can be i m p l e m e n t e d by the a s s o c i a t e d incentive 
s c h e m e . 
N o t e : 
A s s u m p t i o n I . v i i m p l i e s for all S £ @ , C o S <|> for all fi, 
so CxZ / for all x ^ 0 and all S £ 
A l s o , CtS S Ctfi if & £ £ @ and T > t ' . T h i s m e a n s that if the 
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information system collects more signals, more incentive schemes 
can be u s e d . 
Definition : 
VT{fi) = sup { F(f,a): (f,a) £ CtS } 
This is the limit of what the p r i n c i p a l at most can get if the 
information system S is u s e d . 
Remark : 
Since C t£ S C t'S' if and t ^ T' , VT (FI) ^ V t' ) 
Theorem VII.l : -
Assumption li-vi implies for any S £ @ and any t > 0 , there exists 
an optimal incentive scheme f* such that f* s KS , and there exist 
a* £ RT:(f*) and F(f*,a*) = Vt (S) 
Proof of theorem VII.l : 
1) By A I . v , V t(S ) = sup { F ( f : (f,a) s R t S } < « 
2) Construct a sequence < (f^^, aj^ ) > such that (a^, f^ )^ £ CtS for each 
n , and Vt (S) - F (f^^, a^) < 1/n for each n . So this sequence makes 
- Vt ( £ ) . 
3) Since A and KS are compact by assumption A I . i and lemma 工.1, 
there exists a subsequence < (fnk' ^ nk^ > which converges to an 
element of the s e t , say (fnk,ank) — (f*,a*) and (f*,a*) £ K S x A . 
Also (f*,a*) £ Ct:^ by lemma V I I . 4. 
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I 
Also Vt (fi) = lim F(fn,an) = lim F (f , aj^ j^ ) = F(f*,a*) • , 
n - ^ n k〜 
We have F (f *, a*) = ViMfi) and (f *, a*) £ C tS , so the theorem is 
p r o v e d . • 
Definition : 
Define : 
Tt (fi) = [ f £ KFI , there exist a' £ RT:(f) and F(f ,a' ) = VT (FI) } 
This function tells us what is the optimal i n c e n t i v e scheme given 
a particular information system . 
Now what we should do is to define what the term "similarity of 
two information systems" m e a n s . To do so, we use the pesudometric 
of Boylan ( See Allen 2) defined on @ . In doing t h i s , assumption 
II is e s s e n t i a l . 
Assumption II : 
The p r o b a b i l i t y measure p (. | a) is absolutely continuous with 
respectively to ( or << to notate absolutely continuous to ) a 
probability m e a s u r e •(•) defined on r for all a £ A . Therefore, 
we say s o m e t h i n g holds almost everywhere (a.e.) if it is true 
except on the set of measure zero of •(•)• 
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R e m a r k ： 
oo 
For e x a m p l e , if X = n [0,1] is the c a r t e s i a n p r o d u c t of the 
i=l 
i n t e r v a l [0,1], we may assume p(.|a) < < the P r o d u c t L e b e s g u e 
m e a s u r e . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
The d i s t a n c e of two e l e m e n t s S , fi' £ @ : 
d(S,S’） = s u p i n f v { ( G U H ) \ ( G fl H ) } 
G s E H e S ' 
+ sup inf v{ ( G U H ) \ { G 0 H ) } 
H s S ' G s S 
This p e s u d o m e t r i c on @ is i n t r o d u c e d by B o l y a n . O b v i o u s l y , 
d(S,S，） = 0 if and only if all the sets of S and S‘ d i f f e r s only by 
V - m e a s u r e n u l l s e t . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
We say - S if — 0 . 
Lemma V I I . 5 
If FN £ TT (SJ^) , FJJ 一 f a . e . [V] , — S, then for all (f ’，a’） s CtS 
such that F ( f’， a’） > F(f,a) for all a £ Rt (f) , then there exists no 
s e q u e n c e < (f/ ' ) > such that £ C x \ , and f ^ , - f 
a . e . [v] and aj^ ' — a • • 
Proof: 
Suppose not , that is there exists such a s e q u e n c e < ( £ 二 3 ^ ， ） > , 
For each f^, take a^ £ RT (f^ )^ and Fif^^a^) = VT (SJ^ ) . By the 
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c o m p a c t n e s s o f A , w e c a n t a k e a s u b s e q u e n c e < > f r o m 〈 （ a 。 ） 〉 
s u c h t h a t a^ jk a * 8 A . B y l e m m a V I I . 4 , a * s R T : ( f ) . 
S o l i m = F (f^, a^) > F (f , a * ) = l i m F ( f , ). 
n〜 n k - ^ 
S o f o r s o m e n k s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e , w e h a v e F (f ' / ' ) > ^ (f^k' ^ nk^ 
, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h a t a^^ ‘ £ R t c o n t r a d i c t s t h a t F = 
VT(Snk) • 臞 
C o r o l l a r y : 
I f Sn-Eji+l'迟 n 4 fn 一 fn 艺 TT:(Sn) , t h e n f e Tx {&). 
P r o o f : 
I f t h e r e e x i s t s (f’，a,) s u c h t h a t f ‘ £ K E , a， £ R x (f' ) a n d 
F(f，，a’） > F ( f , a ) f o r a l l a £ R t ( f ) , a n d s i n c e f ‘ i s S— m e a s u r a b l e 
i m p l i e s i t i s m e a s u r a b l e f o r a l l n , i t w i l l c o n t r a d i c t f^ ^ s 
T t (S j j) . S o , (f • ) s h o u l d n o t e x i s t , a n d t h e c o r o l l a r y i s 
p r o v e d . 邇 
L e m m a V I I . 6 : 
F o r a n y s e q u e n c e < ^^ >, & , a n d a n y f S— m e a s u r a b l e , t h e r e : e x i s t s 
a s e q u e n c e o f f u n c t i o n s < fjj > a n d e a c h f^ ^ i s S j ^ - m e a s u r a b l e a n d f^ j 
— f a . e . [ v ] . 
P r o o f : 
D e f i n e E a = [ x : f (x) = a } . S o , e i t h e r E a = 少 o r E a = <!> . 
F o r e a c h c h o o s e a c o l l e c t i o n o f s e t s { E a n : |oc| K } , 
E a n £ fijj f o r e a c h a a n d v { U ( E a n U E a ) \ ( E a n n E) } 1 / n . 
\a\<K — 
D e f i n e fj^(x)三 2： oc I ( x) w h e r e I ( • ) i s t h e 
E a n E a n 
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characteristic function of E a n . 
So the V { X: fjj(x) = f (X) } - 0 as n «». Or e q u i v a l e n t l y , f^ 
— f a. e . [v] . H 
The lemma says that if the two information systems are very 
similar, all the incentive schemesin one information system can be 
approximated by some incentive schemes in the other information 
system. 
Definition : 
P(Q) = the collection of all , probability m e a s u r e of Q . 
If Q is compact and s e p a r a b l e , all probability m e a s u r e s defined of 
X are tight, so by Parathasarathy Theorem 6.7 , P (Q) is c o m p a c t . 
M o r e o v e r , it is obvious that P(Q) is c o n v e x . 
Assumption III: 
i) A is convex . 
ii) G(f,.) is a concave function on A for all f which is r-
m e a s u r a b l e . That is , r G(f,a) + ( 1 一 r ) G ( f , a ' )丄 
G ( f , r a + (1 - r) a’） for all f, and all a, a' s A , and for all 
real number r such that 0 < r < 1 . 
Assumption Ill.i-ii can be interpreted as that given action a and 
a', the agent is able to randomize the actions by playing mixed 
s t r a t e g y . In fact, let there be a compact set B , which is the set 
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of actual a c t i o n the agent takes , with generic e l e m e n t b , and the 
probability m e a s u r e over the outcomes is a c t u a l l y P ( . | b ) . Then all 
the agent‘s f e a s i b l e strategy is to r a n d o m i z e all a c t u a l actions b 
£ B . That is A = M ( B ) , then o b v i o u s l y , a s s u m p t i o n 工工工.i-ii is 
satisfied and G ( f , . ) is a linear function in A . 
Lemma VII.7 : 
If assumption III h o l d s , for all x > 0 , f t KZ , as Rx(f} , then 
there exists a s e q u e n c e of actions < a^ ^ > such that a^ ^ — a and 
G (a^rf) > G (a, f) 一 x for all a £ A . 
Proof: 
Let a* m a x i m i z e G ( f , a ) over A . 
Then define a^ = 1/n + a* (1 一 1/n) a . O b v i o u s l y , G(f ^a^^) > G(f ,a) 
for all n . 腥 
Lemma VII.8: 
For any < >, ^ & , and if a £ At(f) for x > 0, then there 
exists a s e q u e n c e of functions < f^ ^ > such that f^ is fi^-measurable 
,fjj — f a . e . [v] , and there is an integer N such t h a t a £ 
A* t (fn) for all n > N . -
Proof : 
By lemma VII.7 , w i t h o u t loss of g e n e r a l i t y , we m a y assume 
G(f,a) — G ( f , a ) < ^^t for all a £ A . 
By lemma V I I . 6 , there exists a sequence of f u n c t i o n < f^ ^ > such 
that fjj is l^n一measurable for each n and f。— f a . e . [v] . W i t h o u t loss 
of g e n e r a l i t y , let |G(f,a) - G (f^ ,^ a) | < 1/n for all a £ A . 
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So G(fn,a) - G(f ,a) = G{f^,a) - G(f,a) 
+ G(f,a) 一 G(f,a) 
+ G(f ,a) -G(fn,a) 
< 1/n + ^T + 1/n 
Take N = 4/t , so for all n > , we have : 
G(fn,a) — G(f,a) ^ x . g 
Lemma V工工.9 
For all T > 0 , and for any sequence of a - a l g e b r a < \ > such that 
Sjj S , let f be S — m e a s u r a b l e and |f (x) | < K for all x £ X , let 
a £ Rx (f) , then there exists a sequence of f u n c t i o n s < fj/ > such 
that f i s l^n一measurable for each n , f^ ’ — f a . e . [v] , and there 
exists an i n t e g e r N such that a E RT (f.' ) and ‘ (x) <K for all 
Ii U 
X £ X if n > N . 
Proof : 
Take < f^ ^ > be a s e q u e n c e of function that f^ is S f m e a s u r a b l e , and 
,fjj - f a . e . [v] and a £ A*t (fj,) for all n . 
Let < e^ > be a s e q u e n c e of real numbers , G (fj^+e^^, a) ^ H - t and e^ 
一 0 . Define f / = f^ + E^  • So a £ A*T (f^ ^ ‘ ) , and G ( f / ,a) > H - T 
for all n . So a £ RT (f^ '^ ) for all n . Since |f (x) | < K for all x 
£ X , and fjj' - f , so there exists an i n t e g e r N such that for all 
n > N , |fjj' (X) I < K for all x £ X . | 
R e m a r k : 
The case of t > 0 is i m p o r t a n t . C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g c a s e . Let 
the sequence of i n f o r m a t i o n systems such that the only feasible 
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incentive scheme： gives the agent's expected utility as the 
following : 
KSjj = { f (a) = c + da ' d 1/n } ‘ so the action a=0 is 
implementable under the , but not implementable under any ^^ 
with n < oo if T = 0. 
Assumption IV : 
Tt(S)I < K for all S 8 @ . 
This means that for all information s y s t e m s , the optimal incentive 
scheme will n e v e r give 土 K to the a g e n t . This is the typical 
principal-agent theory‘s assumption. M o s t literatures find the 
optimal incentive scheme as if there were no , ‘ con s t r a i n t . This 
practice is e q u i v a l e n t to the Assumption I I I . 
Theorem V I I • 2 : 
Assumption 工， 1 1 ,工工工， i m p l y for all i: > 0 , if — S , f^ ^ — f, and 
fjj £ TT (SJ^ ) f o r a l l n , t h e n f £ TT:(S). 
Proof : 
Suppose n o t , that is , there exists a f‘ and a‘ such that f‘s KS, 
a， £ Rt (f' ) and F ( f ' ,a' ) > F(f,a) for all a £ Rx (f) . By lemma 
V I I . 9, there exists a sequence of functions < fj^’> such that 
fjj £ Sjj , a' £ RT (fj^ ) for all n > N . C o n s t r u c t a sequence 
< ajj > by taking a。£ Rt (fjj) , and = .BY the 
compactness of A , we may assume a^. — a * . By lemma VII .4 , 
a* £ RT:(f) . S o F ( f ' , a’） > F ( f , a * ) . 
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Since lim FCf^^' ) = F ( f’， a’） > F(f,a*) = lim , 
n - ^ n 〜 
for all n sufficiently large, F (f , a ' ) > F {t^, a^). 
This together with that a ‘ z Rt (f^ '^ ) , f^ '^ £ KS^^ contradicts f^ ^ £ 
Tt . I 
Corollary : 
For all t > 0 , the real valued function Vt(S) is continuous in @• 
Theorem VII.2 and the corollary tell us that when the two 
inforination systems are similar , their optimal incentive schemes 
are also s i m i l a r , and the principal gets approximate expected 
utility. 
Definition : 
Define the system cost c(S) , c : @ - R > 0 . 
Assumption V : 
i) The p r i n c i p a l ' s net utility given the ( f, a, S) 
= F ( f , a ) - c(fi) 
ii) If SSzB' , then c(B)么 c{£') 
iii) If Sjj — S , then lim c(Sjj) = c(fi). 
n〜 
So if d(S,S’） = 0 , c ( S ) = ) 
iv) c (<J>) = 0 
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A s s u m p t i o n V .ii states that the more signals an i n f o r m a t i o n system 
can g i v e , the h i g h e r the s y s t e m c o s t . A s s u m p t i o n V . i i i states that 
when the two i n f o r m a t i o n systems differ s l i g h t l y , the system costs 
of them d i f f e r s l i g h t l y . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
V*T： = s u p { F ( f , a ) — c (fi) : S £ @ , f £ T t (E) , a s Rr (f) } 
This is the u p p e r limit of w h a t the p r i n c i p a l can g e t by choosing 
various k i n d s of i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s . 
T h e o r e m V工工.3 : . 
If a s s u m p t i o n I - V h o l d , for all t > 0 , there e x i s t ( & * , f*,a*) 
such that fi* £ @ , 
f* e TT (f *) and a* £ Rr(f*) , and F(f*,a*) - c(S*) = V*t:. 
Proof : 
1) V*T： < oo b y A s s u m p t i o n I.v 
2) Choose a s e q u e n c e < > such t h a t : 
V*x - F(fn,an) -c (Z^) < 1/n . 
Since Kr and A are c o m p a c t , there exists a s u b s e q u e n c e < (fj^ j^ , a^ j^^ ) > 
w h i c h c o n v e r g e s to some e l e m e n t , say (f*,a*) , f* £ Kr and a* £ A . 
Take S* to be the a - a l g e b r a g e n e r a t e d by the f u n c t i o n f * . So this 
S* £ @ . T h i s F(f *,a*) - c (B*) =V*x b y the t h e o r e m V I I . 2 and 
a s s u m p t i o n V . • 
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R e m a r k ： 
The e x i s t e n c e of the theorem VII.3 d e p e n d s on t h e o r e m VII.2 . For 
e x a m p l e , if lim > VT(fi) , - S , c(Sjj) = cU q + i ) , 
n~»oo 
then we h a v e V t (Sj^ ) - c iZ^) < Vt 一 。 （ 色 打 + 丄 ） f o r all n , b u t 
lim V t ( S j j ) 一 c(Sjj) > VxiZ) 一 c(S) 
n-oo 




‘ There are N agents ,the ith agent chooses an action a^ s A^ 
. T h e i r actions together determine the p r o b a b i l i t y of an 
N 
elements to occur from an outcome space. D e n o t e A = n A- • Now 
i=l ‘ 
denote a = { a^, . . , a^ j) be an element of A . 
Assumption I‘ 
i) A^ is compact for all i=l,..,N . 
ii) X ‘ the outcome space is a compact s e p a r a b l e metric s p a c e . 
iii) lim p{ E ‘ ‘ ‘ ^ Nk^ = P( E | , . .a^ j) 
k 
for all E £ r . 
iv) For all agent i=l,,,N , utility function of agent i depends on 
income y and action he t a k e s . 
Hj (y. a^) : R Ai - R , Hi is continuous in R and 
Mj = sup { I | : |y| < K , a^ s A^ } < « 
Hf to be the r e s e r v a t i o n utility of agent i, there exist a number 
Yi such that for some a- ‘ £ A^ , H^ (y^^a^) > H-
•) The utility function to the principal : U (m - y): R - R 
where m is the m o n e t a r y outcome , y is the income paid to the 
agent. U{.) is assumed to be continuous, and L=sup{ u(m-y) ： m = 
n (x) for some x £ X , y ^ K } < oo . 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
Given an i n f o r m a t i o n system fi, the p r i n c i p a l is to choose a vector 
of f u n c t i o n s f = (f^, £2, . . . fj|) where f - is the i n c e n t i v e 
N 
scheme to a g e n t i , f^ £ KS for each i • We d e n o t e K"S = n KS , 
, — i = l 
So f £ O b v i o u s l y , K"S is c o m p a c t . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
Let f = (fi,f2, , , ,fN) t. a = ( a” a?, , , , aj^ ) s A , d e f i n e 
Gi(f,a) = Hi(fi(x),ai) p( dx | a^, aj, . . . ajj) 
J X 
for all i = 1 , 2 , , , N 
、 N 
F(f,a) = U ( n ( x ) 一 E fi(x)) p { d x a) 
.X i=l _ 
So G i ( f , a ) is the e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y of the a g e n t i when the 
p r i n c i p a l g i v e s the i n c e n t i v e scheme f• to h i m and the agent plays 
action a^ , a n d o t h e r agent p l a y s a〕. for all j =i • F(f,a) is the 
e x p ected u t i l i t y of the p r i n c i p a l . 
Lemma V I I I . l : 
Let fn = ( fin 'f2n ' • .'fNn ) ' f = ( ^I'h' ' ‘ 
an = (ain ' a2n ' • • aj^n) ‘ a = (a^' a]…a”） 
Let fjj - f , an - a , fjj £ K"r 
for all n , then 
i) G i ( f , a ) = lim G(fjj,ajj) for all i 
n"*oo 





The proof is the same as lemma V I I . 2 and is o m i t t e d h e r e . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
NT(f) z a' £ A : Gi(ai-, • • , a^' , a^^^ ‘ ；f) > 
a-.^ ‘ ' , . . ;f) 一 t 
for all ai £ Ai , for all i = l , , , N 1 
w h e r e t is a n u m b e r ^ 0 . 
Remark : 
No(f) is the N a s h s o l u t i o n of full r a t i o n a l a g e n t s ' action given 
the incentive s c h e m e f . Nt(f) is N a s h s o l u t i o n of the actions of 
the agents of b o u n d e d r a t i o n a l i t y of t if t > 0 • T h i s , tries to 
m o d e l the team w h o s e m e m b e r s are s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d . 
Lemma VI工工.2 : 
i) NT(f) is n o n - e m p t y for all f s K " r , 
ii) if a^ £ NT (fjj) , a^ - a , f^ - f , then a £ N T ( f ) . 
proof : 
i) T r i v i a l . 
ii) Suppose n o t , that is a £ N t U ) , then there e x i s t a^ £ A^ such 
that : G(ai, • • • . ,ajj ； f) 
> G (ai, aj / • . ' ai_i, ai, • • ' ⑴ 一 工 
By lemma V I I I . l , we have ^ • ' ^ i-ln' ' ^ i+ln' ' • • '^Nn^ 
or n s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e , c o n t r a d i c t s to a^ £ NT (f^ )^ for all n . • 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
RNt(f) = [ a : a £ Nt(f) and Gi(f,a) > H^ - T for all i = 1, 
= i f for all a £ NT:(f) , Gi(a,f) < H- - t for some i 
Lemma V I I I . 3 : 
If ajj _ , an £ R N t (f^ )^ , a^ ^ - a, f^ - f, then a e Nt (f). 
Proof : 
Similar to p r o o f of lemma V I I . 3 , so is o m i t t e d h e r e . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
VNt(fi) = sup { F ( f , a ) : a £ RNt{f) , f £ K " S } 
This is the m a x i m u m e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y the p r i n c i p a l can get g i v e n 
the p a r t i c u l a r inforination system and he is e m p l o y i n g a team w i t h 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m e m b e r s . 
Remark : 
S £ or X ^ T' r VNt(fi) ^ V N t ' ) 
This is the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the s u p e r v i s o r y s y s t e m of chapter IV 
and that w i t h o u t s u p e r v i s o r s . Since the s u p e r v i s o r y system is one 
i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m that can c o l l e c t two s i g n a l s : the r e p o r t and 
the team o u t p u t , i t is b e t t e r than the s y s t e m w i t h o u t s u p e r v i s o r s 
w h i c h o n l y g i v e s one s i g n a l of team o u t p u t . 
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Theorem V I I I . l : 
Assumption 工' i m p l i e s for any fi £ @ and any t > 0 , there exists a 
system of o p t i m a l incentive schemes f* such that f* s K"S , and 
I 
there exists a* s RNx(f*) and F(f*,a*) = VNt(S) • 
Proof : 
Similar to theorem VII.1 , so is o m i t t e d . 
Definition : 
Define TNt(S) 
= { f £ , there exists a' £ RNx(f) and F(f,a') = VNt(S) } 
This is the o p t i m a l system of incentive schemes given a particular 
information s y s t e m . 
Assumption I I，： 
p( • |a) << v(.) for all a £ A . 
Assumption 工 工 工 ‘ ： 
i) is c o n v e x . 
ii) Gi(f,.) is a concave function on A for all i = 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Assumption 工 工 ' a n d III’ are similar to that 
of assumption 工工 and III. 
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Lemma V工工工.5: 
For any < \ ^n ^ , and if a £ Nt (f) for x > 0, where 
f = (f J, . . fjj) £ , then there exists a sequence of vector of 
functions and actions < > such that f^ = (fin …ffin) ‘ fin is 
Ejj-measurable for each …， N , for each n ； and f^ f 
a . e . [v] ' an - a , an £ Nt (f^ )^ for all n > N . M o r e o v e r , if | f. (x) 
< K for all X £ X and all i =1,..,N ； then there exists a sequence 
of vector of functions < f / > where f / = (fin、…，ffiri,) such that 
fin, is 〜一measurable for each n and for all i = 1,..N • Also f^ ‘ 
- f , and there exists an integer N such that a £ RN (fjj' ) and 
fin ‘ (x) I ^K for all x £ X , for all i = l , . N , if n ^ N . 
Proof : 
Similar to lemma VII.9 . 
Assumption 工V’ : 
TNt(fi)I < K for all S £ @ . 
Theorem 11.2: 
Assumptions I，，工工，， a n d 工 工 工 • ， imply for all x > 0 , if - S , 
fjj — f a . e . [v] , and f^ z TNt (SJ^ ) for all n , then f £ TNT (S) • 
Proof : 
By applying lemma V I I I . l , VIII.S , and f o l l o w i n g the procedure of 
proof of theorem VII.2 . 
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C o l l a r a v ： 
For all T > 0 , the r e a l v a l u e d function VNt(fi) is c o n t i n u o u s in 
A s s u m p t i o n V‘ : 
The p r i n c i p a l ' s n e t u t i l i t y given the ( f , a , fi) 
〒 F(f,a) — c(S) g i v e n f e K"S , a £ A , S £ @ • w h e r e c(S) is the 
system cost as in a s s u m p t i o n 工V. 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
VN * t = s u p { F(f,A) — c ( S ) ； S @ , f £ TN t(S ) , a £ RN t{F) } 
This is the m a x i m u m e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y the p r i n c i p a l can achieve 
given he is e m p l o y i n g a team w i t h s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d m e m b e r s . 
T h e o r e m VI工工.3 : 
If A I , - V , h o l d then for all t > 0 , there e x i s t { S * , f*,a*) such 
that S* £ @ ,f* £ T N t (f *) and a* s RNT(f*) , and F ( f * , a * ) - c(S*) 
= V N * T . 
Proof : 
Same as t h e o r e m V I I . 3 . 
R e m a r k : 
The e x i s t e n c e of the t h e o r e m V I I I . 3 d e p e n d s on t h e o r e m V I I I . 2 of 
the c o n t i n u i t y of VNx(fi). 
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D e f i n i t i o n ： 
To m o d e l the a l t r u i s t i c team , all w o r k e r s w a n t to m a x i m i z e some 
average of h i s o w n u t i l i t y and his c o l l e a g u e s . L e t W- be a vector 
I 丄 
N N 
in R ' . .Wik, . ”Wijj) , > 0 , Z W-. = 1 , 
k = l 
N x N 
Define W be a v e c t o r W = (W^, , . . . ,Wjj) £ R 
Define : 
N 
GWi(f,a) = Z W^ j^  G M f , a ) for all i = l , . . , N . 
k = l 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
RWT{f) = { a , £ A : GWi(ai’，..，ai-i\ a-' , a-^^ ‘ ；f) > 
G W i (ai，，• •，ai_i • , a^, a^+l，，• .，a^ j，； f) - x ‘ 
f o r a l l AI £ AI , f o r a l l i=l,,,N ; 
G W i ( f , a ' ) ^ H — T for a l l i = l , . . , N } 
w h e r e t is a n u m b e r > 0 . 
This models the o u t c o m e a c t i o n s of a team w i t h a l t r u i s t i c m e m b e r s . 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
VWx (S) = sup [ F ( f , a ) : a £ R W t U ) , f £ K " S } 
This is the m a x i m u m the p r i n c i p a l can g e t g i v e n he is e m p l o y i n g a 
team w i t h a l t r u i s t i c m e m b e r s and the p a r t i c u l a r i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m . 
R e m a r k : 
& and T ^ T' , VW t (FI)么 VWT' (£') 
111 
T h e o r e m V I I I . 4 : 
Assumption.工，implies for any fi @ and any t k 0 , there exists a 
system of an o p t i m a l incentive s c h e m e s f* such that f* £ there 
exists a* z RW t ( f * ) and F(f*,a*) = V W x { £ ) 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
D e f i n e TWt(E) 
= [ f s K"S , t h e r e exists a' £ RWirU) and F(f,a’）= VWt (fi) } 
T h i s is the o p t i m a l system of i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e s given the 
p a r t i c u l a r i n f o r m a t i o n system and the a l t r u i s t i c t e a m . 
A s s u m p t i o n I V " : 
TWt(S)I < K for a l l S £ @ . 
T h e o r e m V I I I . 5 : 
A s s u m p t i o n I, 一工工 I , and IV" h o l d , for all x > 0 , if Z , 
fjj “ f' and fjj £ TWT {S^) for all n , then f £ T W t (£) .So, for all 
T： > 0 , the r e a l v a l u e d f u n c t i o n VW t (S) is c o n t i n u o u s in 
D e f i n i t i o n : 
VW*T = sup { F ( f , a ) — c(S) : S @ , f £ TWt(fi) , a £ R W T ( f ) } 
This is the m a x i m u m the p r i n c i p a l can g e t if he is e m p l o y i n g an 
a l t r u i s t i c t e a m . 
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Theorem VIII.6 : 
If AI',工工，，工工工，，iv" and V , hold , then for all t > 0 , there exists 
( f * , a * ) such that S* £ @ ,f* £ TWT:(f*) and a* £ RWT (f * ) , 
and F(f*,a*) - c(E*) = V W * T . 
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